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Abstract	  
	  
This	  examination	  of	  U.S.	  economic	  policy	  directed	  toward	  Chile	  centered	  on	  the	  political	  and	  economic	  changes	  that	  occurred	  within	  Chile	  between	  1960	  and	  1988.	  During	  this	  time,	  U.S.	  economic	  policy	  directed	  toward	  Chile	  was	  crafted	  by	  members	  of	  the	  American	  government	  uneasy	  with	  Cold	  War	  concerns	  with	  the	  most	  important	  of	  which	  being	  the	  spread	  of	  Communism	  throughout	  the	  globe.	  By	  viewing	  U.S.	  policy	  toward	  Chile	  through	  this	  Cold	  War	  lens,	  this	  thesis	  explores	  the	  different	  ways	  in	  which	  economic	  policy	  was	  used	  to	  advance	  the	  political	  and	  economic	  goals	  within	  not	  only	  Chile,	  but	  also	  Latin	  America	  as	  a	  whole.	  	  The	  Cold	  Warriors	  that	  crafted	  and	  enacted	  these	  economic	  policies	  were	  motivated	  by	  a	  variety	  of	  factors,	  and	  influenced	  by	  events	  outside	  of	  their	  control.	  From	  President	  John	  F.	  Kennedy	  to	  Ronald	  Reagan,	  American	  policymakers	  utilized	  economic	  policy	  as	  a	  means	  to	  achieve	  regional	  goals.	  This	  project	  sheds	  light	  on	  an	  understudied	  section	  of	  U.S.	  foreign	  policy	  history	  by	  exploring	  the	  way	  that	  economic	  policy	  helped	  achieve	  Cold	  War	  objectives	  in	  the	  Southern	  Cone.	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Introduction	  
	  
	  In	  this	  project,	  I	  analyze	  U.S.	  economic	  policy	  directed	  toward	  Chile	  between	  the	  years	  1960	  and	  1988.	  Although	  the	  relations	  between	  Santiago	  and	  Washington	  during	  the	  Cold	  War	  are	  a	  well-­‐documented	  piece	  of	  U.S.	  foreign	  policy	  history,	  the	  specific	  economic	  policies	  and	  the	  motivation	  behind	  them	  are	  less	  well	  known.	  	  Within	  this	  thesis,	  the	  definition	  of	  “economic	  policy”	  is	  expansive	  and	  includes	  a	  variety	  of	  different	  types	  of	  actions	  that	  are	  not	  necessarily	  universally	  recognized	  as	  economic	  policy.	  To	  be	  specific,	  I	  define	  “economic	  policy”	  as	  any	  type	  of	  government	  action	  that	  utilizes	  financial	  power	  or	  leverage	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  achieve	  political	  or	  economic	  goals.	  Using	  this	  definition,	  both	  the	  refusal	  to	  grant	  loans	  to	  Chile	  as	  well	  as	  the	  funding	  of	  opposition	  parties	  by	  the	  CIA	  can	  be	  considered	  examples	  of	  economic	  policy.	  	   As	  a	  part	  of	  this	  examination,	  I	  analyze	  the	  policies	  of	  the	  American	  government	  from	  President	  John	  F.	  Kennedy	  through	  Ronald	  Reagan	  in	  order	  to	  answer	  three	  major	  questions.	  First,	  what	  kind	  of	  economic	  policies	  were	  enacted	  in	  Washington	  during	  the	  1960s	  and	  1970s	  to	  address	  the	  rising	  popularity	  of	  leftist	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policies	  in	  Chile?	  Second,	  in	  what	  ways	  did	  neoliberal	  economic	  ideology	  influence	  the	  policies	  from	  Washington	  and	  within	  Santiago?	  Finally,	  how	  did	  the	  Reagan	  Administration	  use	  economic	  power	  and	  policy	  to	  achieve	  its	  political	  and	  economic	  goals	  within	  Chile	  during	  the	  last	  years	  of	  the	  Cold	  War?	  	  	   By	  addressing	  these	  three	  questions,	  this	  thesis	  offers	  a	  broader	  understanding	  of	  how	  and	  why	  U.S.	  economic	  policy	  was	  crafted	  during	  the	  Cold	  War	  in	  order	  to	  achieve	  various	  goals.	  Furthermore,	  these	  three	  questions	  break	  the	  thesis	  into	  three	  equally	  important	  categories	  that	  reflect	  the	  change	  in	  overall	  U.S.	  policy	  over	  time.	  	  The	  first	  chapter,	  which	  deals	  with	  U.S.	  economic	  policies	  crafted	  and	  enacted	  between	  1960	  and	  1973,	  sheds	  light	  on	  how	  American	  policymakers	  were	  able	  to	  use	  economic	  leverage	  to	  fight	  the	  spread	  of	  leftist	  political	  movements	  in	  Chile.	  During	  this	  time,	  Chile	  experienced	  a	  highly	  influential	  demographic	  shift	  that	  shook	  the	  foundations	  of	  the	  political	  system	  throughout	  the	  country.	  In	  order	  to	  address	  these	  changes,	  the	  American	  government	  utilized	  a	  variety	  of	  tactics	  to	  ensure	  economic	  and	  political	  stability.	  	  	  The	  second	  chapter	  is	  less	  focused	  on	  a	  specific	  period	  of	  time	  and	  instead	  centers	  on	  neoliberal	  economic	  theory	  as	  a	  framework	  for	  the	  investigation	  into	  U.S.	  economic	  policy	  toward	  Chile.	  Through	  an	  examination	  of	  a	  variety	  of	  primary	  and	  secondary	  sources	  that	  deal	  specifically	  with	  the	  use	  of	  neoliberal	  economic	  policies	  in	  Latin	  America,	  I	  will	  uncover	  the	  true	  intentions	  and	  results	  of	  these	  policies	  in	  Chile.	  For	  example,	  Naomi	  Klein’s	  Shock	  Doctrine:	  The	  Rise	  of	  Disaster	  Capitalism	  and	  Jonathan	  Haslam’s	  The	  Nixon	  Administration	  and	  the	  Death	  of	  Allende’s	  Chile:	  A	  Case	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of	  Assisted	  Suicide	  both	  give	  compelling	  accounts	  of	  how	  neoliberal	  economic	  models	  affected	  Chilean	  economic,	  political,	  and	  social	  development	  during	  the	  middle	  to	  late	  Cold	  War.	  Using	  a	  combination	  of	  both	  the	  aforementioned	  secondary	  sources	  as	  well	  as	  declassified	  primary	  sources,	  I	  explore	  the	  legacy	  of	  neoliberalism	  in	  Chile	  during	  the	  1970s	  and	  argue	  that	  the	  aggressive	  and	  uncompromising	  nature	  of	  the	  economic	  reforms	  laid	  the	  foundation	  for	  the	  economic	  and	  political	  collapse	  that	  occurred	  in	  the	  1980s.	  	  The	  third	  and	  final	  chapter	  of	  this	  thesis	  will	  provide	  a	  comprehensive	  account	  of	  American	  economic	  policies	  directed	  toward	  Chile	  under	  the	  Reagan	  Administration.	  The	  1980s	  were	  a	  key	  decade	  in	  the	  examination	  of	  U.S.	  economic	  policy	  toward	  Chile	  and	  my	  investigation	  of	  the	  Reagan	  Administration	  at	  this	  time	  provide	  the	  major	  contribution	  of	  this	  thesis.	  During	  this	  time	  there	  was	  a	  massive	  deterioration	  of	  diplomatic	  relations	  between	  Washington	  and	  Santiago.	  As	  a	  result,	  during	  the	  early	  1980s	  there	  was	  a	  clear	  shift	  that	  occurred	  within	  the	  Reagan	  Administration	  that	  centered	  on	  a	  reconsideration	  of	  democratic	  ideals,	  economic	  considerations,	  and	  a	  growing	  concern	  of	  a	  Communist	  uprising	  within	  Chile.	  These	  various	  factors	  came	  together	  and	  led	  Reagan,	  who	  had	  attempted	  to	  normalize	  relations	  with	  Pinochet,	  to	  distance	  himself	  from	  the	  violent	  dictator.	  	  For	  the	  sake	  of	  this	  investigation,	  I	  found	  that	  the	  amount	  of	  information	  during	  the	  1980s	  was	  so	  complex	  that	  the	  Reagan	  years	  needed	  a	  chapter	  of	  their	  own.	  During	  this	  time	  there	  was	  a	  massive	  deterioration	  of	  diplomatic	  relations	  between	  Washington	  and	  Santiago.	  In	  addition,	  economic	  turmoil	  and	  a	  rise	  in	  human	  rights	  violations	  within	  Chile	  created	  a	  situation	  in	  which	  the	  United	  States	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government	  needed	  to	  craft	  effective	  economic	  policy	  measures	  in	  order	  to	  maintain	  stability	  within	  not	  only	  Chile,	  but	  Latin	  America	  as	  a	  whole.	  	  In	  researching	  this	  project,	  I	  used	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  primary	  and	  secondary	  sources	  in	  order	  to	  fully	  grasp	  the	  key	  issues	  behind	  U.S.-­‐Chilean	  relations	  during	  the	  time.	  	  One	  area	  in	  particular	  that	  is	  important	  to	  analyze	  in	  order	  to	  comprehend	  the	  relationships	  that	  were	  solidified	  during	  Pinochet’s	  reign	  is	  American	  foreign	  policy	  toward	  Pinochet’s	  predecessor,	  Dr.	  Salvador	  Allende.	  	  Understanding	  this	  area	  of	  U.S.	  foreign	  policy	  is	  integral	  to	  this	  exploration	  of	  U.S.	  economic	  policy	  directed	  toward	  Chile	  during	  the	  Cold	  War.	  The	  policies	  that	  were	  enacted	  during	  the	  1960s	  and	  early	  1970s	  set	  the	  foundation	  for	  the	  economic,	  political,	  and	  social	  issues	  that	  plagued	  Chile	  until	  the	  return	  of	  democracy	  in	  the	  late	  1980s.	  In	  terms	  of	  primary	  sources,	  I	  was	  able	  to	  synthesize	  information	  from	  a	  variety	  of	  both	  public	  and	  declassified	  documents	  in	  order	  to	  gain	  a	  full	  understanding	  of	  U.S.	  economic	  policy	  toward	  Chile	  during	  the	  middle	  to	  late	  Cold	  War.	  Specifically,	  declassified	  documents	  from	  the	  Digital	  National	  Security	  Archive	  as	  well	  as	  meeting	  minutes	  and	  policy	  memorandums	  from	  the	  Foreign	  Relations	  of	  
the	  United	  States	  collection	  painted	  a	  vivid	  picture	  of	  how	  the	  American	  government	  crafted	  its	  various	  policies	  toward	  Chile	  at	  this	  time.	  	  The	  wide	  variety	  of	  texts	  and	  resources	  that	  this	  thesis	  required	  reflects	  the	  complexity	  of	  the	  U.S.	  foreign	  economic	  policy	  at	  this	  time.	  During	  the	  Cold	  War	  specifically,	  American	  policymakers	  became	  increasingly	  concerned	  with	  the	  perceived	  encroachment	  of	  Communism	  and	  thus	  poured	  out	  resources	  to	  nations	  that	  were	  anti-­‐Communist.	  However,	  in	  retrospect,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  these	  politicians	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were	  unable	  or	  unwilling	  to	  recognize	  the	  long-­‐term	  repercussions	  of	  aggressively	  waging	  Cold	  War	  tactics	  to	  achieve	  short	  term	  objectives	  in	  Chile.	  	  This	  project	  will	  answer	  key	  questions	  in	  a	  widely	  under-­‐studied	  area	  of	  American	  history:	  the	  factors	  that	  play	  a	  role	  in	  the	  crafting	  of	  U.S.	  foreign	  economic	  policy.	  	  This	  exploration	  into	  U.S.	  economic	  policy	  during	  the	  middle	  to	  late	  Cold	  War	  will	  uncover	  how	  and	  why	  American	  policymakers	  used	  economic	  policies	  to	  advance	  their	  regional	  goals.	  From	  supporting	  political	  parties	  that	  were	  seen	  as	  allies	  of	  the	  American	  government,	  to	  implementing	  economic	  destabilization	  tactics	  in	  order	  to	  destroy	  the	  growth	  of	  perceived	  communist	  threats,	  the	  American	  government	  found	  a	  multitude	  of	  situations	  in	  which	  economic	  policy	  was	  the	  most	  effective	  option	  at	  achieving	  its	  goals.	  	  This	  thesis	  examines	  the	  complexities	  of	  U.S.	  economic	  relations	  directed	  toward	  Chile	  during	  middle	  to	  late	  Cold	  War.	  	  The	  lack	  of	  current	  academic	  work	  on	  this	  area	  opens	  up	  an	  opportunity	  to	  provide	  significant	  contributions	  to	  this	  area	  of	  scholarship.	  	  	  By	  writing	  this	  thesis,	  I	  hope	  to	  open	  up	  new	  avenues	  of	  research	  and	  scholarship	  within	  the	  broader	  subject	  of	  U.S.	  foreign	  relations	  during	  the	  Cold	  War.	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Chapter	  One:	  American	  Economic	  Policy	  Toward	  Chile	  Resulting	  In	  The	  Rise	  and	  Fall	  of	  Salvador	  Allende	  
	  
	  
	  
“I	  don’t	  see	  why	  we	  need	  to	  stand	  by	  and	  watch	  a	  country	  go	  communist	  
because	  of	  the	  irresponsibility	  of	  its	  own	  people”	  Henry	  Kissinger,	  United	  States	  National	  Security	  Advisor	  under	  President	  Richard	  Nixon,	  June	  27,	  19701.	  	  	  The	  economic	  relations	  between	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Chile	  during	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  20th	  century	  were	  highly	  complex.	  During	  this	  time,	  American	  government	  officials	  and	  politicians	  from	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  aisle	  fought	  to	  solidify	  their	  influence	  in	  Chile	  as	  a	  Cold	  War	  ally.	  A	  central	  component	  of	  this	  fight	  within	  the	  American	  political	  system	  was	  economic	  policy.	  The	  majority	  of	  American	  foreign	  policy	  during	  this	  era	  was	  implemented	  through	  indirect	  means	  that	  were	  less	  obvious	  than	  dropping	  bombs,	  but	  potentially	  just	  as	  dangerous.	  	  Put	  simply,	  U.S.	  economic	  policy	  toward	  Chile	  during	  the	  Cold	  War	  centered	  on	  maintaining	  Chile’s	  economic	  and	  political	  stability.	  The	  efforts	  of	  John	  F.	  Kennedy,	  Lyndon	  Johnson,	  and	  Richard	  Nixon	  to	  influence	  the	  politics	  of	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Constable,	  Pamela	  and	  Arturo	  Valenzuela,	  A	  Nation	  of	  Enemies:	  Chile	  Under	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Southern	  Cone,	  and	  Chile	  specifically,	  through	  sometimes	  extreme	  economic	  policy	  directives	  characterized	  American	  foreign	  policy	  in	  Latin	  America	  at	  the	  time.	  As	  I	  will	  argue	  in	  this	  chapter,	  these	  aforementioned	  economic	  policy	  directives	  had	  substantial	  and	  severe	  consequences	  for	  the	  Chilean	  people	  and	  the	  nation	  as	  a	  whole.	  	   The	  1960’s	  were	  a	  decade	  that	  shaped	  the	  political	  and	  economic	  relations	  between	  the	  United	  States	  and	  many,	  if	  not	  all,	  Latin	  American	  nations.	  Chile	  was	  not	  immune	  to	  this	  trend.	  	  During	  this	  era,	  the	  Chilean	  government	  received	  massive	  amounts	  of	  economic	  aid	  as	  well	  as	  general	  administrative	  and	  diplomatic	  assistance	  by	  the	  American	  government.	  	  Leading	  the	  charge	  of	  this	  foreign	  economic	  policy	  from	  Washington	  was	  President	  John	  F.	  Kennedy	  himself.	  	  One	  of	  Kennedy’s	  most	  well-­‐known	  foreign	  policy	  achievements,	  the	  Alliance	  for	  Progress,	  became	  a	  cornerstone	  of	  American	  foreign	  policy	  toward	  the	  region	  during	  his	  administration2.	  Established	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  build	  and	  strengthen	  economic	  and	  political	  ties	  with	  Latin	  American	  nations	  through	  the	  use	  of	  economic	  aid	  and	  other	  political	  assistance,	  the	  Alliance	  for	  Progress	  played	  an	  enormous	  role	  in	  the	  evolution	  of	  Chilean	  politics.	  Eventually,	  the	  legacy	  of	  Kennedy’s	  Alliance	  for	  Progress	  in	  Chile	  would	  set	  the	  stage	  for	  neoliberal	  economic	  reform	  and	  the	  fall	  of	  import	  substitution	  industrialization.	  	  	  	   Although	  the	  long-­‐term	  effects	  of	  the	  Alliance	  for	  Progress	  on	  Latin	  America	  and	  the	  Chilean	  economy	  in	  particular	  are	  still	  debated	  amongst	  scholars	  today,	  the	  immediate	  economic	  effects	  of	  the	  program	  are	  relatively	  clear	  to	  the	  Cold	  War	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Rabe,	  Stephen	  G.,	  The	  Killing	  Zone.	  New	  York,	  New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2012,	  xxxvi.	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scholar.	  In	  short,	  the	  program	  was	  designed	  to	  increase	  economic	  growth	  and	  democratization	  through	  a	  variety	  of	  programs	  including,	  but	  not	  limited	  to,	  economic	  aid,	  trade	  liberalization,	  land	  reform,	  and	  basic	  economic	  and	  social	  planning3.	  In	  the	  Charter	  of	  Punta	  del	  Este,	  which	  was	  signed	  in	  1961	  at	  an	  inter-­‐American	  conference	  to	  establish	  the	  Alliance	  for	  Progress,	  the	  goals	  of	  the	  program	  were	  outlined	  explicitly	  within	  the	  preamble:	  	  	   It	  is	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  Alliance	  for	  Progress	  to	  enlist	  the	  full	  energies	  of	  the	  people	  and	  governments	  of	  the	  American	  republics	  in	  a	  great	  cooperative	  effort	  to	  accelerate	  the	  economic	  and	  social	  development	  of	  the	  participating	  countries	  of	  Latin	  America,	  so	  that	  they	  may	  achieve	  maximum	  levels	  of	  well-­‐being,	  with	  equal	  opportunities	  for	  all,	  in	  democratic	  societies	  adapted	  to	  their	  own	  needs	  and	  desires.4	  	  By	  1962,	  the	  Alliance	  for	  Progress	  had	  become	  a	  cornerstone	  of	  American	  foreign	  policy	  under	  the	  Kennedy	  Administration	  in	  Latin	  America.	  Hundreds	  of	  millions	  of	  dollars	  had	  been	  promised	  to	  governments	  throughout	  the	  region	  to	  fund	  a	  variety	  of	  economic	  concerns	  from	  short-­‐term	  credit	  opportunities	  to	  military	  assistance.	  	  President	  Kennedy	  and	  other	  policymakers	  in	  Washington	  believed	  that	  bolstering	  the	  Chilean	  economy	  would	  lead	  to	  a	  powerful	  economic	  and	  political	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Punta	  Del	  Este	  Charter,	  August	  17,	  1961.	  Yale	  Law	  School,	  http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/intam16.asp.	  Accessed	  October	  12,	  2012.	  	  4	  Ibid.	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ally	  in	  the	  ever-­‐intensifying	  Cold	  War.	  One	  of	  these	  factors	  was	  the	  abundance	  of	  copper	  in	  Chile.	  The	  high	  levels	  of	  raw	  copper	  gained	  the	  attention	  of	  U.S.	  investors	  both	  in	  the	  private	  and	  public	  sector	  early	  in	  the	  20th	  century.	  During	  the	  1960’s,	  Chile	  was	  in	  possession	  of	  roughly	  half	  of	  the	  world’s	  raw	  copper	  reserves5.	  
	  Largely	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  enormous	  economic	  asset	  that	  these	  copper	  reserves	  provided	  to	  Chile,	  the	  nation	  was	  able	  to	  boast	  large	  growth	  rates	  for	  the	  overall	  economy.	  Due	  to	  the	  huge	  attraction	  to	  investors,	  money	  began	  flowing	  into	  Chile	  by	  the	  truckload:	  “between	  1962	  and	  1969	  Chile	  took	  more	  than	  $1	  billion	  from	  the	  Americans	  in	  aid,	  loans	  and	  grants;	  between	  1964	  and	  1970,	  $200-­‐300	  million	  in	  short	  term	  credit	  was	  continuously	  open	  to	  Chile	  from	  US	  banks.”6	  Kennedy’s	  program	  was	  one	  that	  relied	  upon	  assurances	  by	  the	  Latin	  American	  governments	  that	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  program	  would	  be	  implemented	  as	  quickly	  and	  efficiently	  as	  possible.	  	  However,	  in	  many	  cases	  throughout	  the	  region,	  the	  Alliance	  for	  Progress	  faced	  heavy	  resistance	  by	  both	  Latin	  Americans	  and	  their	  governments.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Chile,	  President	  Jorge	  Alessandri,	  who	  had	  won	  the	  Presidency	  in	  1958,	  was	  initially	  a	  large	  opponent	  of	  the	  program.	  However,	  Alessandri	  eventually	  succumbed	  to	  the	  American	  economic	  program	  and	  implemented	  various	  economic,	  political	  and	  social	  reform	  measures	  within	  the	  country:	  Jonathan	  Haslam	  argues	  that	  “Alessandri	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Skidmore,	  Thomas	  E.	  et	  al.,	  ed.,	  Modern	  Latin	  America	  Seventh	  Edition.	  New	  York,	  New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2010.	  282-­‐284.	  6	  Haslam,	  Jonathan,	  The	  Nixon	  Administration	  and	  the	  Death	  of	  Allende’s	  Chile:	  A	  Case	  
of	  Assisted	  Suicide.	  New	  York,	  New	  York:	  New	  Left	  Books,	  2005.	  13.	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had…attempted	  and	  failed	  to	  resist	  the	  new	  wave	  of	  US	  policy	  under	  President	  Kennedy	  –	  the	  Alliance	  for	  Progress	  –	  which	  dictated	  land	  redistribution	  of	  Chile’s	  latifundia…	  to	  transform	  the	  feudal	  nature	  of	  the	  agrarian	  economy.”7	  	  In	  only	  a	  matter	  of	  years,	  socioeconomic	  problems	  began	  to	  rise	  alongside	  a	  growth	  in	  the	  electorate,	  which	  created	  a	  fundamental	  shift	  in	  Chilean	  politics.	  By	  the	  early	  1960’s,	  four	  major	  political	  groups	  had	  taken	  center-­‐stage:	  the	  right	  (Conservative	  and	  Liberal	  parties),	  the	  Marxist	  left	  (Communists	  and	  Socialists),	  the	  Centrist	  Radicals,	  and	  the	  Christian	  Democrats8.	  The	  change	  in	  the	  electorate	  and	  the	  rising	  tensions	  regarding	  socioeconomic	  concerns	  within	  Chile	  set	  the	  stage	  for	  the	  1964	  Presidential	  election	  to	  become	  one	  of	  the	  most	  important	  in	  recent	  Chilean	  history.	  	  During	  the	  early	  stages	  of	  the	  1964	  presidential	  election	  in	  Chile,	  it	  became	  increasingly	  evident	  that	  the	  Front	  for	  Popular	  Action	  (FRAP),	  or	  Chilean	  left-­‐wing	  political	  coalition,	  had	  a	  high	  chance	  of	  taking	  control	  of	  the	  Chilean	  government	  through	  peaceful	  and	  legitimate	  elections.	  In	  particular,	  the	  candidate	  for	  the	  leftist	  coalition,	  Dr.	  Salvador	  Allende,	  was	  deemed	  as	  a	  candidate	  whose	  ideology	  ran	  directly	  counter	  to	  U.S.	  interests	  in	  the	  region.	  As	  early	  as	  1962	  President	  Kennedy	  was	  notified	  of	  this	  and	  thus	  the	  issue	  traveled	  to	  the	  forefront	  of	  his	  foreign	  policy	  objectives.	  Shortly	  after	  the	  aforementioned	  news	  reached	  the	  White	  House,	  President	  Kennedy	  “passed	  on	  responsibility	  to	  his	  brother,	  the	  attorney-­‐general.”9	  Nearly	  immediately	  the	  CIA	  began	  “serious	  preparations	  to	  forestall	  such	  an	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Haslam,	  Jonathan,	  The	  Nixon	  Administration	  and	  the	  Death	  of	  Allende’s	  Chile,	  49.	  8	  Ibid.,	  292.	  9	  Haslam,	  Jonathan,	  The	  Nixon	  Administration	  and	  the	  Death	  of	  Allende’s	  Chile,	  12.	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eventuality”	  and	  approved	  immediate	  monetary	  support	  to	  the	  two	  opposition	  parties	  to	  the	  FRAP,	  the	  Christian	  Democrats	  and	  the	  Radical	  Party10.	  In	  1962,	  the	  mid	  term	  parliamentary	  elections	  resulted	  in	  a	  substantial	  victory	  for	  the	  FRAP	  and	  a	  decisive	  loss	  for	  the	  Chilean	  conservatives11.	  	  At	  this	  point,	  the	  American	  government	  began	  to	  seriously	  reconsider	  their	  actions	  (or	  lack	  of	  action)	  in	  Chile	  in	  terms	  of	  fighting	  the	  spread	  of	  leftist	  politics.	  	  In	  addition,	  during	  this	  time,	  many	  policymakers	  and,	  perhaps	  more	  importantly,	  the	  American	  public,	  was	  unaware	  of	  the	  involvement	  of	  the	  American	  government	  in	  the	  Chilean	  political	  system.	  Specifically	  speaking	  about	  the	  1964	  election,	  the	  extent	  of	  U.S.	  involvement	  in	  the	  election	  was	  massive.	  Throughout	  the	  course	  of	  the	  election	  period,	  roughly	  $4	  million	  dollars	  had	  been	  spent	  by	  the	  American	  government	  in	  order	  to	  support	  various	  parties	  that	  competed	  against	  the	  FRAP	  and	  perform	  “some	  fifteen	  covert	  action	  programs”	  to	  undermine	  the	  FRAP’s	  own	  political	  objectives12.	  Over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  1964	  Presidential	  election	  in	  Chile,	  slightly	  more	  than	  half	  of	  the	  total	  cost	  of	  the	  Christian	  Democrats	  campaign	  was	  paid	  for	  by	  the	  CIA13.	  Although	  the	  economic	  policy	  of	  the	  American	  government	  at	  this	  time	  was	  indeed	  massive	  and	  should	  not	  be	  overlooked,	  the	  financial	  side	  of	  the	  CIA’s	  action	  was	  only	  one	  half	  of	  their	  covert	  program.	  The	  other	  half,	  which	  involved	  “a	  massive	  anti-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Ibid.,	  12.	  	  11	  Ibid.,	  15.	  12	  Church	  Committee,	  “Covert	  Action	  in	  Chile	  1963-­‐1973,”	  U.S.	  Department	  of	  State.	  http://foia.state.gov/reports/churchreport.asp	  Accessed	  September	  22,	  2012.	  	  13	  Ibid.	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communist	  propaganda	  campaign,”	  was	  a	  major	  component	  of	  the	  American	  clandestine	  operation	  in	  Chile	  during	  the	  1960’s14.	  	  	  In	  order	  to	  destabilize	  the	  leftist	  political	  parties,	  the	  CIA	  quickly	  began	  both	  traditional	  and	  innovative	  methods	  of	  spreading	  propaganda.	  First	  and	  foremost,	  the	  use	  of	  pamphlets	  and	  radio	  shows	  to	  spread	  propaganda	  became	  common	  and	  produced	  positive	  results.	  Alongside	  these	  methods,	  the	  CIA	  also	  became	  involved	  in	  “political	  action	  operations”	  to	  encourage	  Chilean	  citizens	  who	  were	  less-­‐likely	  to	  vote	  for	  Allende	  to	  become	  politically	  engaged15.	  The	  combination	  of	  these	  tactics	  created	  a	  situation	  in	  which	  politics	  as	  usual	  were	  essentially	  non-­‐existent.	  The	  Church	  Committee,	  a	  Congressional	  Committee	  organized	  in	  1975	  to	  investigate	  U.S.	  involvement	  in	  covert	  political	  activity,	  later	  summarized	  the	  CIA’s	  opinion	  on	  the	  success	  of	  this	  campaign:	  “The	  CIA	  regards	  the	  anti-­‐communist	  scare	  campaign	  as	  the	  most	  effective	  activity	  undertaken	  by	  the	  U.S.	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  Christian	  Democratic	  candidate.”16	  	  The	  election	  in	  1964,	  which	  eventually	  tilted	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  Christian	  Democrats	  under	  the	  leadership	  of	  Eduardo	  Frei,	  was	  seen	  as	  an	  affirmation	  for	  the	  CIA	  that	  their	  plan	  had	  worked.	  	  Due	  to	  the	  economic	  aid	  given	  to	  the	  Christian	  Democrats	  in	  conjunction	  with	  the	  “Scare	  Campaign”	  enacted	  by	  the	  CIA	  during	  the	  election	  campaign,	  the	  election	  resulted	  in	  a	  “landslide	  victory.”17	  	  The	  economic	  aid	  in	  this	  case	  was	  not	  associated	  with	  the	  Alliance	  for	  Progress;	  rather,	  the	  money	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  Ibid.	  15	  Ibid.	  16	  Church	  Committee,	  “Covert	  Action	  in	  Chile	  1963-­‐1973,”	  U.S.	  Department	  of	  State.	  http://foia.state.gov/reports/churchreport.asp	  Accessed	  September	  22,	  2012.	  17	  Rabe,	  Stephen	  G.	  The	  Killing	  Zone,	  125.	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used	  to	  bolster	  Frei’s	  victory	  in	  1964	  was	  funneled	  directly	  through	  the	  CIA:	  “The	  Central	  Intelligence	  Agency	  would	  later	  admit	  to	  contributing	  more	  than	  50	  percent	  of	  Frei’s	  campaign	  expenses…it	  may	  have	  been	  a	  case	  of	  overkill.”18	  The	  1964	  election	  was	  seen	  as	  a	  pivotal	  moment	  by	  American	  policymakers	  concerned	  with	  the	  growing	  popularity	  of	  leftist	  political	  movements.	  Following	  the	  election	  in	  1958	  where	  the	  FRAP	  almost	  won	  through	  a	  plurality,	  the	  U.S.	  government	  did	  not	  want	  to	  take	  any	  chances	  in	  the	  1964	  election	  where	  Frei’s	  capitalist	  reformism	  was	  battling	  against	  Allende’s	  Marxism19.	  As	  a	  result	  of	  this	  fear,	  the	  CIA	  provided	  significant	  funds	  to	  the	  Frei	  campaign,	  but	  also	  to	  the	  Radical	  candidate,	  Julio	  Duran20.	  By	  funding	  the	  Radical	  candidate	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  Christian	  Democrats,	  the	  American	  government	  was	  able	  to	  solidify	  their	  support	  of	  Frei	  while	  ensuring	  that	  at	  least	  a	  few	  of	  Allende’s	  supporters	  on	  the	  far	  left	  would	  instead	  vote	  for	  Duran:	  “There	  were	  rumors	  that	  the	  U.S.	  embassy	  actively	  encouraged	  Duran	  to	  stay	  in	  the	  race,	  since	  it	  was	  felt	  that	  the	  election	  would	  be	  close	  enough	  that	  a	  few	  Radical	  votes	  for	  Allende	  might	  tip	  the	  balance.”21	  	  Frei	  and	  the	  Christian	  Democrats	  came	  away	  with	  56%	  of	  the	  vote,	  Dr.	  Salvador	  Allende	  received	  39%,	  and	  the	  Radical	  Party	  under	  Duran	  received	  5%.	  Despite	  this	  loss,	  the	  election	  of	  1964,	  similar	  to	  the	  election	  of	  1958,	  was	  a	  small	  victory	  for	  Allende	  and	  the	  FRAP	  as	  they	  had	  “increased	  their	  share	  of	  the	  electorate	  from	  5	  percent	  in	  1952	  to	  28	  percent	  in	  1958	  to	  39	  percent	  in	  1964.”22	  	  As	  we	  will	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  Skidmore,	  Thomas	  E.	  et	  al,	  Modern	  Latin	  America	  293.	  19	  Ibid.,	  293.	  20	  Sigmund,	  Paul	  E.,	  The	  United	  States	  and	  Democracy	  in	  Chile.	  P.	  22.	  21	  Ibid.,	  22.	  	  22	  Rabe,	  Stephen	  G.	  The	  Killing	  Zone,	  125.	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see,	  the	  1964	  Presidential	  election	  set	  the	  stage	  for	  Allende	  to	  eventually	  take	  power	  in	  1970.	  	  Due	  to	  a	  couple	  of	  changing	  factors	  within	  the	  Chilean	  economic	  and	  political	  structure,	  Eduardo	  Frei’s	  administration	  struggled	  during	  his	  term	  in	  office.	  From	  1964	  to	  1970,	  the	  Christian	  Democrats	  attempted	  to	  balance	  economic	  reform	  that	  encouraged	  liberalization	  with	  a	  domestic	  policy	  reform	  package	  that	  became	  known	  as	  “Chileanization.”23	  This	  domestic	  policy	  centered	  on	  a	  variety	  of	  socioeconomic	  issues	  that	  plagued	  Chileans.	  One	  of	  the	  issues	  that	  was	  particularly	  pervasive	  within	  all	  areas	  of	  Chilean	  domestic	  politics,	  economics,	  and	  social	  structure	  was	  the	  copper	  industry.	  Since	  1920,	  two	  major	  U.S.	  corporations	  –	  Anaconda	  and	  the	  Kennecott	  Corporation,	  had	  dominated	  the	  Chilean	  copper	  industry24.	  	  These	  two	  American	  companies	  played	  a	  dominant	  role	  both	  in	  Chilean	  economic	  issues	  as	  well	  as	  political	  issues.	  The	  problem,	  however,	  was	  not	  only	  the	  large	  level	  of	  power	  that	  these	  companies	  held.	  Rather,	  the	  miniscule	  number	  of	  Chilean	  jobs	  that	  these	  companies	  provided	  as	  well	  as	  the	  relatively	  small	  amount	  of	  income	  that	  reached	  the	  Chilean	  people	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  copper	  industry	  became	  a	  major	  concern	  for	  many	  Chileans.	  Due	  to	  the	  complexities	  of	  the	  copper	  industry,	  Chilean	  businesses	  involved	  in	  the	  copper	  industry	  looked	  to	  foreign	  investors	  in	  order	  to	  provide	  capital	  and	  the	  technology	  necessary	  to	  run	  a	  copper	  mine.	  This	  necessity	  by	  Chilean	  mine	  owners	  led	  to	  foreign	  acquisitions	  of	  the	  aforementioned	  mines	  early	  in	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  Ibid.,	  125.	  24	  Skidmore,	  Thomas	  E.	  et	  al,	  Modern	  Latin	  America	  282.	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20th	  century	  and	  from	  then	  on,	  the	  companies	  relied	  upon	  foreign	  direct	  investment	  as	  opposed	  to	  domestic	  participation	  as	  a	  primary	  driver	  for	  the	  industry.25	  Frei’s	  attempt	  to	  bring	  more	  jobs	  to	  Chileans	  through	  the	  copper	  industry	  was	  met	  by	  fierce	  resistance	  by	  the	  American	  government	  as	  well	  as	  American	  investors	  and	  corporations.	  	  Although	  centrist	  in	  nature,	  Frei’s	  plans	  of	  Chileanization	  lacked	  support	  by	  both	  the	  Chilean	  left	  and	  the	  conservative	  American	  government.	  Specifically,	  Frei’s	  plan	  revolved	  around	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  Chilean	  government	  would	  buy	  portions	  of	  the	  ownership	  of	  the	  copper	  companies,	  and	  reinvest	  any	  profits	  back	  into	  the	  company	  to	  expand	  domestic	  production,	  and	  as	  a	  result,	  create	  more	  jobs26.	  	  Eventually,	  Frei	  was	  able	  to	  implement	  this	  plan,	  but	  the	  results	  were	  lackluster:	  copper	  production	  only	  increased	  by	  10	  percent	  and	  a	  large	  percentage	  of	  the	  increased	  earnings	  went	  directly	  to	  the	  American	  corporations	  due	  to	  technicalities	  established	  in	  the	  new	  contracts27.	  Despite	  this	  increased	  earnings,	  the	  American	  government	  and	  business	  community	  still	  lacked	  faith	  in	  the	  Frei	  administration.	  	  One	  of	  the	  things	  that	  these	  investors	  feared	  most	  was	  nationalization	  of	  any	  business	  on	  any	  level.	  Folding	  under	  the	  pressure,	  Frei	  was	  unable	  to	  “produce	  as	  much	  copper	  or	  as	  many	  new	  jobs	  as	  planned.”28	  In	  addition,	  this	  clash	  of	  ideology	  between	  Santiago	  and	  Washington	  bred	  tension	  and	  created	  an	  enemy	  for	  Frei	  within	  the	  administration	  of	  Lyndon	  Johnson.	  Both	  sides	  felt	  the	  loss	  of	  political	  allegiance	  as	  the	  Chilean	  economy	  began	  to	  slip	  and	  the	  Johnson	  administration	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  Ibid.,	  282.	  26	  Ibid.,	  293.	  27	  Ibid.,	  293-­‐294.	  28	  Rabe,	  Stephen	  G.,	  The	  Killing	  Zone	  125.	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became	  increasingly	  concerned	  about	  the	  state	  of	  Chile	  for	  the	  upcoming	  1970	  presidential	  election.	  	  	  	  This	  ideological	  battle	  between	  Frei	  and	  U.S.	  policymakers	  in	  regards	  to	  domestic	  Chilean	  policy	  was	  a	  pivotal	  moment	  in	  which	  foreign	  economic	  policy	  would	  be	  drastically	  altered.	  In	  order	  for	  the	  Chilean	  copper	  industry	  to	  have	  performed	  at	  its	  highest	  capabilities,	  massive	  amounts	  of	  investment	  was	  necessary.	  For	  years,	  this	  money	  came	  from	  U.S.	  investors	  or	  other	  foreign	  private	  investors	  in	  conjunction	  with	  government	  funding.	  The	  Alliance	  for	  Progress	  program	  offered	  Chile	  a	  substantial	  amount	  of	  government	  funding	  which	  helped	  create	  a	  spike	  in	  production	  and	  profitability	  during	  the	  early	  1960’s29.	  However,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  Frei’s	  effort	  to	  distance	  himself	  from	  U.S.	  investors	  and	  encourage	  the	  Chileanization	  of	  the	  copper	  industry	  led	  to	  not	  only	  economic	  consequences,	  but	  also	  severe	  political	  problems.	  By	  alienating	  American	  investors,	  the	  Frei	  administration	  also	  cut	  itself	  off	  from	  investment	  from	  the	  American	  government	  through	  the	  Alliance	  for	  Progress.	  As	  a	  result,	  economic	  problems	  began	  to	  arise	  within	  Chile	  and	  in	  order	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  Chilean	  economy	  would	  not	  collapse,	  economists	  and	  policymakers	  in	  D.C.	  and	  Santiago	  looked	  to	  the	  private	  sector	  for	  a	  solution.	  	  This	  moment	  is	  pivotal	  in	  the	  story	  of	  U.S.	  economic	  policy	  toward	  Chile	  during	  the	  Cold	  War.	  Following	  the	  battle	  over	  the	  Chilean	  copper	  industry,	  the	  Alliance	  for	  Progress	  slowly	  began	  to	  fail	  as	  focus	  was	  taken	  further	  and	  further	  away	  from	  government	  investment	  and	  closer	  to	  private	  investment.	  More	  broadly,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  Ibid.,	  123-­‐124.	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this	  transition	  from	  government	  aid	  to	  private	  investment	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  shift	  from	  President	  Kennedy	  to	  President	  Johnson.	  Under	  Lyndon	  Johnson’s	  administration,	  the	  policies	  of	  the	  Alliance	  for	  Progress	  were	  reconsidered	  as	  relationships	  with	  Latin	  American	  governments	  (including	  Chile)	  deteriorated.	  The	  amount	  of	  success	  that	  occurred	  due	  to	  government	  aid	  was	  questioned	  and,	  as	  a	  result,	  American	  policymakers	  began	  to	  promote	  the	  idea	  of	  encouraging	  private	  enterprise	  to	  become	  involved	  in	  international	  issues.	  	  This	  tug	  of	  war	  between	  government	  aid	  and	  private	  enterprise	  helped	  set	  the	  stage	  for	  the	  1970	  election,	  which	  proved	  to	  be	  a	  major	  moment	  in	  U.S.-­‐Chilean	  history.	  	  The	  issues	  that	  surrounded	  the	  Chilean	  copper	  industry	  were	  only	  one	  element	  of	  the	  Frei	  Administration	  that	  was	  seen	  as	  a	  failure	  by	  Chileans	  as	  well	  as	  foreign	  observers.	  More	  broadly,	  Frei	  made	  it	  a	  personal	  goal	  of	  his	  to	  save	  the	  failing	  capitalist	  economic	  structure	  in	  Chile.	  	  His	  efforts	  at	  Chileanization,	  especially	  in	  regards	  to	  the	  copper	  industry,	  was	  only	  one	  specific	  policy	  aspect	  of	  the	  Frei	  Administration.	  	  Frei’s	  experience	  as	  president	  was	  extremely	  moderated,	  as	  Chileans	  as	  well	  as	  foreign	  observers	  saw	  him	  as	  a	  compromise	  between	  “avaricious	  capitalism	  and	  a	  totalitarian	  communism.”30	  One	  of	  the	  major	  tenets	  of	  Frei’s	  efforts	  as	  President	  was	  economic	  reform	  measures	  in	  order	  to	  save	  Chile’s	  failing	  capitalist	  system.	  	  Frei’s	  economic	  reform	  platform	  included	  two	  central	  components:	  land	  reform	  and	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  Winn,	  Peter	  “Weavers	  of	  Revolution”	  61.	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Chileanization	  of	  the	  major	  industries,	  most	  importantly	  copper,	  as	  previously	  discussed31.	  Frei’s	  moderated	  economic	  strategy	  proved	  to	  be	  incapable	  of	  fixing	  the	  problems	  within	  Chile’s	  capitalist	  structure.	  As	  a	  centrist	  leading	  the	  Chilean	  government,	  Frei	  had	  hoped	  to	  bring	  both	  capital	  and	  labor	  forces	  together	  to	  limit	  backlash	  on	  the	  economy	  as	  well	  as	  fund	  his	  adjustment	  measures32.	  However,	  cooperation	  between	  the	  two	  forces	  was	  weak	  at	  best	  and	  caused	  both	  sides	  to	  take	  “advantage	  of	  the	  opportunities	  it	  offered	  to	  advance	  their	  interests	  while	  avoiding	  the	  sacrifices	  it	  demanded.”33	  In	  addition,	  the	  Chilean	  government	  was	  incapable	  of	  promoting	  change	  within	  the	  economic	  system	  due	  to	  the	  high	  level	  of	  protection,	  corruption,	  and	  manipulation	  that	  had	  become	  standard	  operating	  procedure	  within	  the	  Chilean	  economy.	  	  According	  to	  Peter	  Winn,	  Frei	  was	  unable	  to	  fix	  the	  “dependent	  Chilean	  capitalism	  accustomed	  to	  government	  credits	  at	  negative	  interest	  rates,	  oligopolistic	  control	  of	  protected	  markets,	  and	  windfall	  profits	  from	  monetary	  manipulation	  and	  financial	  speculations.”34	  As	  a	  direct	  result	  of	  this	  failure,	  the	  Chilean	  economy	  began	  to	  see	  major	  losses	  in	  both	  productivity	  and	  performance.	  Between	  the	  years	  1966	  and	  1970,	  economic	  growth	  decreased	  by	  50%,	  inflation	  grew	  to	  over	  30%,	  and	  unemployment	  reached	  8%35.	  Within	  a	  short	  period	  of	  time,	  the	  Chilean	  government	  began	  to	  lose	  credibility	  as	  it	  lost	  control	  of	  the	  economy.	  This	  decrease	  in	  economic	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  Ibid.,	  61.	  	  32	  Winn,	  Peter	  “Weavers	  of	  Revolution,”	  62.	  33	  Ibid.,	  62.	  	  34	  Ibid.,	  62.	  	  35	  Ibid.,	  62.	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performance,	  along	  with	  the	  political	  disputes	  that	  accompanied	  it,	  set	  the	  stage	  for	  the	  historic	  1970	  presidential	  election.	  	  The	  1970	  election	  was	  reflective	  of	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  factors	  from	  a	  change	  in	  U.S.	  participation	  to	  a	  transformation	  within	  Chilean	  politics	  itself.	  	  Most	  important	  to	  the	  analysis	  of	  economic	  relations	  between	  the	  U.S.	  and	  Chile,	  however,	  are	  the	  policies	  that	  emanated	  from	  Langley	  and	  the	  White	  House	  during	  this	  time.	  	  It	  is	  clear	  that	  both	  the	  Nixon	  Administration	  and	  the	  CIA	  were	  very	  active	  in	  influencing	  the	  outcome	  of	  Chilean	  politics	  during	  the	  years	  leading	  up	  to	  the	  1970	  election.	  Following	  six	  years	  of	  economic	  slowdown	  and	  increasing	  political	  power	  of	  the	  leftist	  political	  coalition	  (the	  Popular	  Unity	  party),	  Dr.	  Salvador	  Allende	  and	  other	  leftist	  politicians	  became	  confident	  that	  he	  could	  overcome	  the	  challenge	  of	  his	  opponent,	  former	  President	  Jorge	  Alessandri,	  in	  the	  1970	  election.	  Eventually,	  in	  fall	  of	  1970,	  Allende	  would	  indeed	  overcome	  Alessandri.	  However,	  the	  years	  leading	  up	  to	  this	  election	  are	  particularly	  important	  to	  this	  analysis.	  	  The	  United	  States,	  as	  mentioned	  previously,	  began	  facing	  a	  deteriorating	  relationship	  between	  the	  White	  House	  and	  Santiago	  as	  Frei	  moved	  further	  and	  further	  away	  from	  the	  President’s	  influence.	  During	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  1960’s,	  this	  rift	  in	  the	  relationship	  created	  an	  environment	  that	  grabbed	  the	  interest	  of	  American	  policymakers.	  	  Throughout	  the	  latter	  half	  of	  the	  decade,	  the	  American	  government	  became	  increasingly	  interested	  in	  the	  Chilean	  political	  process	  and	  economy	  that	  “Chile	  [had]	  not	  seen	  in	  five	  years	  of	  relative	  stability.”36	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  Haslam,	  Jonathan,	  The	  Nixon	  Administration	  and	  the	  Death	  of	  Allende’s	  Chile,	  37.	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Starting	  as	  early	  as	  1967,	  the	  American	  government	  began	  crafting	  ways	  to	  fight	  the	  spreading	  influence	  of	  leftist	  politics	  in	  Latin	  America.	  	  Through	  the	  newly	  established	  “Action	  for	  Progress,”	  United	  States	  policymakers	  would	  encourage	  trade	  and	  prosperity	  with	  Latin	  America	  through	  “trade	  and	  not	  aid.”37	  In	  addition	  to	  this	  program,	  Washington	  carried	  out	  a	  two-­‐pronged	  attack	  on	  The	  Unidad	  Popular	  party	  and	  Salvador	  Allende	  that	  was	  strikingly	  similar	  to	  the	  tactics	  used	  in	  the	  1964	  election.	  Again,	  the	  CIA	  implemented	  a	  “scare	  campaign”	  while	  massive	  amounts	  of	  U.S.	  funding	  flowed	  into	  the	  political	  campaigns	  of	  Allende’s	  opponents38.	  	  	  Directing	  this	  decision-­‐making	  process	  for	  the	  United	  States	  was	  the	  40	  Committee,	  a	  group	  of	  advisors	  that	  worked	  for	  the	  Executive	  Branch	  to	  review	  and	  oversee	  covert	  affairs	  and	  actions	  by	  the	  American	  government39.	  In	  1970,	  the	  40	  Committee	  authorized	  a	  variety	  of	  plans	  that	  targeted	  Allende:	  “The	  40	  Committee	  authorized	  $425,000	  in	  covert	  spending…to	  be	  used	  in	  a	  ‘spoiling’	  campaign	  against	  the	  Allende	  coalition.”40	  The	  40	  Committee	  played	  a	  quintessential	  role	  in	  the	  oversight	  and	  execution	  of	  covert	  operations	  in	  Chile	  during	  this	  time.	  On	  June	  27	  1969,	  the	  Committee	  met	  with	  President	  Nixon,	  Kissinger,	  and	  other	  key	  members	  of	  the	  Nixon	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  Church	  Committee,	  “Covert	  Action	  in	  Chile	  1963-­‐1973,”	  U.S.	  Department	  of	  State.	  http://foia.state.gov/reports/churchreport.asp	  Accessed	  September	  22,	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  Ibid.	  39	  Rabe,	  Stephen	  G.	  The	  Killing	  Zone	  127.	  40	  Ibid.,	  127.	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Administration	  to	  discuss	  the	  upcoming	  presidential	  election	  in	  Chile41.	  	  At	  this	  meeting,	  the	  Committee	  discussed	  potential	  contingency	  plans	  to	  bribe	  Chilean	  congressmen	  to	  deny	  Allende’s	  confirmation	  to	  the	  presidency.	  Although	  no	  specific	  plans	  were	  approved	  directly	  in	  that	  meeting,	  the	  Committee	  did	  give	  approval	  to	  the	  director	  of	  the	  CIA	  to	  move	  forward	  in	  preparations	  to	  bribe	  Chilean	  officials:	  “CIA	  was	  instructed	  to	  proceed	  with	  plans	  toward	  identifying	  ‘persuadable’	  individuals	  within	  Congress	  but	  because	  of	  the	  risks	  involved	  to	  take	  no	  action	  without	  further	  approval	  by	  the	  Committee.”42	  The	  aforementioned	  $425,000	  was	  only	  the	  tip	  of	  the	  iceberg	  in	  the	  American	  economic	  program	  toward	  Chile	  during	  this	  time.	  The	  CIA	  operated	  in	  concert	  with	  various	  Chilean	  media	  outlets	  including	  radio	  and	  newspapers	  in	  order	  to	  spread	  propaganda.	  In	  addition,	  operatives	  used	  the	  same	  tactics	  as	  1964	  in	  order	  to	  “motivate”	  certain	  groups	  of	  Chileans	  to	  vote	  in	  favor	  of	  Alessandri,	  or	  anyone	  other	  than	  Allende.	  Unlike	  the	  situation	  in	  1964,	  however,	  the	  U.S.	  ambassador	  was	  not	  convinced	  that	  the	  American	  tactics	  would	  be	  sufficient	  means	  of	  blocking	  Allende’s	  election.	  	  For	  example,	  by	  June	  1970,	  Ambassador	  Korry	  had	  requested	  that	  the	  U.S.	  government	  to	  set	  up	  a	  “a	  contingency	  slush	  fund	  to	  bribe	  Chilean	  congressmen	  not	  to	  certify	  an	  Allende	  victory.”43	  	  Despite	  the	  aforementioned	  steps	  taken	  by	  the	  U.S.	  government,	  the	  election	  of	  1970	  was	  a	  massive	  slap	  in	  the	  face	  to	  the	  Nixon	  Administration.	  Allende	  walked	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  Library,	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  40	  Committee	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  Elections.”	  http://www.nixonlibrary.gov/virtuallibrary/releases/dec10/15.pdf	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away	  with	  a	  plurality	  of	  36.6%	  of	  the	  popular	  vote,	  and	  Alessandri	  had	  taken	  35.3%44.	  	  As	  soon	  as	  the	  election	  results	  reached	  the	  White	  House,	  Nixon	  made	  his	  dissatisfaction	  known	  by	  those	  around	  him:	  “An	  outraged	  President	  Richard	  M.	  Nixon	  took	  the	  news	  as	  a	  personal	  affront,	  smashing	  his	  fist	  into	  his	  hand	  repeatedly	  denouncing	  …	  ‘that	  son	  of	  a	  bitch	  Allende.’”45	  	  The	  events	  that	  followed	  Allende’s	  election	  in	  1970	  were	  seen	  as	  pivotal	  to	  Nixon,	  U.S.	  policymakers,	  and	  the	  CIA.	  For	  Nixon,	  this	  became	  a	  matter	  of	  personal	  consequence.	  Along	  with	  his	  national	  security	  advisor	  Henry	  Kissinger,	  Nixon	  believed	  that	  the	  American	  government	  must	  do	  everything	  it	  could	  to	  keep	  Allende	  from	  being	  inaugurated46.	  From	  an	  economic	  perspective,	  this	  assertion	  by	  the	  President	  marked	  a	  major	  turning	  point	  in	  U.S.-­‐Chilean	  relations.	  Moving	  forward,	  economic	  relations	  would	  be	  only	  used	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  destabilize	  Allende	  during	  his	  months	  as	  President-­‐elect.	  This	  ideological	  departure	  from	  Kennedy’s	  Alliance	  for	  Progress	  is	  one	  of	  the	  most	  important	  trends	  in	  Nixon-­‐era	  economic	  diplomacy.	  	  Using	  a	  combination	  of	  private	  sector	  and	  governmental	  efforts,	  the	  Nixon	  Administration	  almost	  immediately	  began	  attempts	  at	  keeping	  Allende	  from	  taking	  power	  in	  Chile.	  As	  Kissinger	  famously	  remarked	  in	  regards	  to	  American	  efforts	  at	  destabilizing	  Allende,	  “I	  don’t	  see	  why	  we	  need	  to	  stand	  idly	  by	  and	  watch	  a	  country	  go	  communist	  due	  to	  the	  irresponsibility	  of	  its	  own	  people.”47	  During	  this	  time,	  Nixon	  himself	  turned	  to	  as	  many	  trusted	  advisors	  as	  he	  could	  rally	  while	  at	  the	  same	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  Thomas	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  al,	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  Pamela	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time	  shutting	  himself	  off	  from	  most	  outside	  sources,	  including	  the	  previously	  trusted	  40	  Committee48.	  In	  one	  particularly	  secretive	  meeting,	  Nixon	  met	  with	  Attorney	  General	  John	  Mitchell	  and	  Director	  of	  the	  CIA	  Richard	  Helms	  and	  these	  three	  men	  discussed	  plans	  to	  conduct	  covert	  operations	  in	  Chile	  to	  destabilize	  Allende.	  Years	  later,	  Helms’	  notes	  of	  the	  meeting	  revealed	  one	  of	  Nixon’s	  eventual	  goals	  of	  the	  operation:	  to	  “make	  the	  economy	  scream.”49	  	  As	  efforts	  to	  destabilize	  Allende	  began	  to	  come	  apart,	  Nixon’s	  economic	  program	  started	  to	  come	  to	  life.	  From	  American	  corporations	  with	  vested	  interest	  in	  Chile	  to	  business	  owners	  and	  economic	  elites	  within	  Chile	  itself,	  many	  groups	  and	  individuals	  became	  prime	  targets	  for	  Nixon’s	  economic	  destabilization	  program.	  In	  theory,	  his	  program	  would	  encourage	  businesses	  within	  Chile	  to	  promote	  economic	  instability	  on	  a	  domestic	  level	  while	  massive	  cuts	  in	  aid	  and	  economic	  assistance	  would	  cripple	  Chile’s	  economy	  on	  an	  international	  level.	  To	  this	  point,	  American	  foreign	  aid	  to	  Chile	  decreased	  from	  over	  $260	  million	  in	  1967	  to	  under	  $4	  million	  by	  197350.	  More	  specifically,	  during	  this	  transition	  period	  in	  which	  Allende	  was	  President-­‐elect,	  pressures	  from	  both	  the	  U.S.	  private	  sector	  as	  well	  as	  government	  itself	  were	  at	  an	  all-­‐time	  high.	  	  The	  dividing	  lines	  that	  can	  be	  drawn	  between	  government	  and	  private	  funding	  disappeared	  during	  this	  time.	  In	  most	  studies,	  it	  is	  unclear	  the	  balance	  between	  the	  actions	  of	  private	  American	  companies	  and	  the	  American	  government	  itself.	  What	  is	  clear,	  however,	  are	  the	  actions	  themselves.	  The	  economic	  attempts	  by	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these	  actors	  were	  varied	  in	  their	  approaches	  as	  well	  as	  their	  effectiveness.	  At	  the	  end	  of	  the	  day,	  Allende	  was	  successful	  in	  surviving	  the	  pressures	  put	  on	  by	  the	  Chilean	  business	  community	  and	  American	  government;	  however,	  he	  did	  not	  escape	  unscathed.	  	  During	  the	  late	  summer	  and	  early	  fall	  of	  1970,	  Chile	  experienced	  a	  variety	  of	  strikes	  and	  economic	  issues	  that	  arose	  largely	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  efforts	  to	  promote	  instability	  by	  the	  American	  government	  and	  business	  community:	  “Business	  groups,	  with	  covert	  aid	  from	  the	  Nixon	  administration,	  unleashed	  a	  crusade	  of	  economic	  sabotage	  against	  Allende:	  grocers	  hoarded	  food,	  truck	  owners	  refused	  to	  deliver	  it,	  and	  business-­‐led	  strikes	  paralyzed	  the	  country	  twice.”51	  	  The	  actions	  of	  Chilean	  business	  owners	  and	  leaders	  domestically	  were	  able	  to	  conduct	  many	  strikes	  similar	  to	  the	  one	  described	  above	  and	  successfully	  created	  economic	  chaos	  for	  policymakers	  in	  Santiago.	  More	  important	  to	  this	  study,	  however,	  is	  the	  action	  taken	  by	  the	  U.S.	  business	  community	  in	  order	  to	  advance	  their	  own	  interests	  in	  the	  Southern	  Cone.	  	  Allende’s	  election	  frustrated	  and	  concerned	  many	  U.S.	  business	  leaders	  who	  had	  “major	  investments”	  in	  Chile52.	  Allende	  and	  his	  party	  were	  clear	  on	  their	  agenda	  in	  terms	  of	  plans	  to	  radically	  change	  the	  socioeconomic	  structure	  within	  Chile.	  For	  companies	  such	  as	  Ralston	  Purina,	  Ford,	  and	  ITT,	  Allende’s	  election	  was	  simply	  one	  step	  closer	  to	  “nationalization	  or	  government	  expropriation.”53	  	  In	  order	  to	  avoid	  this	  potential	  disaster,	  American	  business	  leaders	  began	  working	  side	  by	  side	  with	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Nixon	  and	  other	  White	  House	  officials	  to	  stem	  the	  influence	  of	  Allende	  and,	  if	  possible,	  keep	  him	  from	  taking	  control	  of	  the	  Chilean	  government.	  	  	  More	  specifically,	  many	  companies	  began	  reaching	  out	  to	  Nixon	  once	  news	  began	  to	  reach	  them	  regarding	  Allende’s	  election	  to	  office.	  Prior	  to	  the	  meeting	  in	  which	  Richard	  Helms	  wrote	  that	  Nixon	  wanted	  to	  “make	  the	  economy	  scream,”	  President	  Nixon	  had	  met	  “with	  Donald	  Kendall,	  the	  U.S.	  head	  of	  Pepsi-­‐Cola…and	  Kissinger	  had	  breakfast	  with	  Agustin	  Edwards,	  a	  Chilean	  media	  magnate.	  Both	  Kendall	  and	  Edwards	  pressed	  for	  U.S.	  intervention	  against	  Allende.”54	  	  As	  mentioned	  previously,	  these	  tactics	  by	  the	  U.S.	  private	  sector	  as	  well	  as	  Nixon	  Administration	  were	  unsuccessful.	  On	  November	  3rd,	  1970,	  Dr.	  Salvador	  Allende	  was	  inaugurated	  as	  the	  President	  of	  Chile.	  However,	  the	  same	  tactics	  previously	  explained	  would	  be	  carried	  out	  and	  increased	  in	  intensity	  over	  the	  next	  few	  years	  of	  Allende’s	  time	  in	  office.	  	  In	  order	  to	  more	  fully	  understand	  the	  implications	  of	  the	  actions	  taken	  by	  American	  government	  officials	  and	  business	  leaders	  in	  terms	  of	  economic	  relations	  with	  Chile	  during	  this	  time,	  a	  thorough	  understanding	  of	  Allende’s	  own	  economic	  policies	  is	  critical.	  Having	  been	  elected	  on	  a	  platform	  of	  social	  and	  political	  change,	  most	  officials	  within	  Chile	  and	  throughout	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world	  were	  aware	  that	  Allende	  was	  not	  an	  expert	  on	  economic	  reform	  or	  economic	  relations55.	  However,	  once	  he	  was	  inaugurated,	  Dr.	  Allende	  wasted	  no	  time	  in	  solidifying	  an	  economic	  program	  that	  suited	  his	  goals.	  	  At	  the	  forefront	  of	  this	  economic	  program	  was	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Professor	  Pedro	  Vuskovic	  Bravo,	  a	  Marxist	  economist	  that	  Allende	  recruited	  from	  the	  Universidad	  de	  Chile.56	  	  	  In	  late	  1970,	  Vuskovic,	  along	  with	  Allende	  and	  the	  rest	  of	  his	  senior	  cabinet	  officials,	  began	  to	  implement	  some	  of	  the	  features	  of	  the	  economic	  program.	  In	  short,	  this	  program	  aimed	  at	  addressing	  the	  current	  issues	  that	  faced	  the	  Chilean	  economy	  (inflation	  and	  high	  foreign	  debt)	  as	  well	  as	  creating	  the	  conditions	  to	  fundamentally	  change	  the	  socioeconomic	  inequality	  that	  existed	  at	  the	  time57.	  The	  compromise	  between	  addressing	  current	  and	  future	  concerns	  was	  a	  necessary	  element	  of	  the	  plan,	  as	  Allende	  desperately	  wanted	  to	  make	  substantive	  change	  but	  recognized	  that	  35%	  inflation	  and	  a	  public	  external	  debt	  that	  was	  above	  $2	  billion	  were	  immediate	  concerns	  that	  needed	  to	  be	  fixed58.	  	  Allende	  attempted	  to	  address	  these	  problems	  through	  a	  variety	  of	  ways.	  First	  and	  foremost,	  his	  manipulation	  of	  the	  domestic	  economy	  was	  noticeable	  and	  effective	  for	  short-­‐term	  economic	  stimulation.	  By	  freezing	  prices	  and	  raising	  wages	  for	  Chilean	  workers,	  consumer	  purchasing	  power	  skyrocketed	  and,	  as	  a	  result,	  the	  economy	  was	  revitalized59.	  Secondly,	  and	  more	  important	  for	  the	  topic	  at	  hand,	  Allende	  almost	  immediately	  targeted	  the	  copper	  industry	  for	  nationalization:	  “top	  priority	  went	  to	  the	  complete	  nationalization	  of	  the	  copper	  industry.”60	  In	  the	  short	  term,	  this	  nationalization	  led	  to	  massive	  political	  support	  for	  Allende	  (“the	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congressional	  vote	  on	  this	  issue	  was	  unanimous”),	  which	  supplemented	  his	  economic	  program	  with	  much	  needed	  popular	  support61.	  	  By	  1972,	  this	  economic	  resurgence	  had	  fallen	  back	  into	  insignificance	  as	  the	  economic	  program	  grew	  too	  expansive	  for	  the	  “inexperienced”	  government	  to	  handle62.	  A	  combination	  of	  the	  unstable	  price	  control	  program,	  domestic	  and	  foreign	  economic	  sabotage	  and	  resistance,	  as	  well	  as	  “the	  inefficiency	  of	  an	  inexperienced	  government	  trying	  to	  take	  over	  and	  run	  huge	  sectors	  of	  the	  economy,	  all	  led	  to	  this	  economic	  flop	  in	  the	  early	  years	  of	  197063.	  The	  American	  government	  and	  business	  community	  relished	  in	  the	  sliding	  Chilean	  economy	  due	  to	  the	  inherent	  drop	  in	  Allende’s	  support	  that	  went	  along	  with	  it.	  After	  all,	  these	  actors	  had	  spent	  a	  lot	  of	  time	  and	  energy	  since	  Allende	  was	  sworn	  into	  office	  to	  see	  him	  fail.	  What	  they	  did	  between	  November	  1970	  and	  September	  1973	  to	  economically	  destabilize	  Allende’s	  Chile	  is	  a	  crucial	  element	  of	  the	  U.S.-­‐Chilean	  economic	  relations	  during	  the	  Cold	  War.	  	  The	  increasing	  instability	  of	  the	  Chilean	  economy	  made	  the	  Allende	  government	  an	  easy	  target	  for	  Nixon	  and	  other	  American	  actors.	  U.S.	  policymakers	  and	  business	  leaders	  from	  the	  private	  sector	  acted	  in	  concert	  during	  this	  time	  to	  put	  pressure	  on	  the	  socialist	  economic	  programs	  that	  Allende	  was	  attempting	  to	  install	  within	  Chile.	  In	  many	  cases,	  the	  economic	  action	  taken	  by	  these	  North	  American	  actors	  was	  supplemented	  by	  the	  weakness	  within	  Chile	  itself.	  	  Within	  only	  a	  few	  months,	  Allende’s	  coalition	  government	  began	  to	  deteriorate	  as	  economic	  performance	  began	  to	  slide.	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From	  the	  beginning	  of	  his	  time	  in	  office,	  Dr.	  Allende	  faced	  a	  serious	  challenge	  when	  it	  came	  to	  political	  power	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  he	  only	  won	  the	  election	  through	  a	  plurality	  of	  the	  vote64.	  	  On	  this	  same	  note,	  popular	  opinion	  and	  political	  consolidation	  within	  Santiago	  became	  less	  of	  a	  function	  of	  Allende’s	  own	  popularity,	  but	  rather	  a	  reflection	  of	  the	  country’s	  opinion	  toward	  the	  way	  that	  the	  economy	  was	  being	  handled.	  The	  combination	  of	  intense	  foreign	  influence	  and	  the	  inherently	  transformative	  nature	  of	  Allende’s	  economic	  program	  led	  to	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  repercussions	  that	  spanned	  from	  Chile’s	  political	  structure	  to	  its	  economy	  as	  a	  whole.	  Within	  a	  matter	  of	  months,	  the	  Allende	  government’s	  mandate	  to	  politically,	  economically,	  and	  socially	  transform	  Chile	  began	  to	  deteriorate	  as	  inflation	  grew,	  unemployment	  rose,	  and	  overall	  economic	  growth	  plummeted65.	  	  	  This	  economic	  crisis	  in	  Chile	  must	  be	  viewed	  through	  a	  lens	  of	  foreign	  economic	  relations.	  Although	  American	  economic	  forces	  were	  not	  the	  only	  actors	  invested	  in	  the	  Chilean	  economy	  at	  the	  time,	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  Nixon	  Administration	  as	  well	  as	  the	  U.S.	  private	  sector	  was	  exponentially	  more	  impactful	  than	  the	  efforts	  made	  by	  countries	  such	  as	  Germany,	  France,	  or	  Great	  Britain.	  As	  stated	  previously,	  the	  Nixon	  Administration	  made	  it	  a	  goal	  to	  “make	  the	  economy	  scream”	  through	  a	  combination	  of	  covert	  action,	  formal	  cuts	  to	  aid	  and	  access	  to	  loans,	  and	  support	  of	  Allende’s	  opposition66.	  In	  comparing	  U.S.	  aggregate	  economic	  aid	  to	  Chile	  from	  the	  Allende	  years	  to	  years	  prior	  to	  Allende’s	  election,	  the	  difference	  is	  clear:	  Between	  1962	  and	  1970,	  the	  yearly	  average	  amount	  of	  aid	  given	  through	  loans	  and	  grants	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was	  $80	  million,	  or	  roughly	  1.1%	  of	  annual	  GDP.	  Between	  1971	  and	  1973,	  that	  same	  number	  dipped	  down	  to	  $6	  million	  dollars67.	  	  	  Nixon	  and	  his	  advisors	  were	  well	  aware,	  however,	  that	  cutting	  U.S.	  formal	  aid	  would	  not	  be	  enough	  to	  make	  a	  sizable	  impact	  on	  Allende’s	  Chile.	  Therefore,	  the	  American	  government	  began	  reaching	  out	  to	  international	  aid	  organizations	  (namely	  the	  World	  Bank	  and	  Inter-­‐American	  Development	  Bank)	  and	  lobbied	  for	  decreased	  access	  to	  loans	  for	  the	  Chilean	  government.	  	  The	  decrease	  in	  funding	  available	  for	  the	  Chilean	  government	  through	  these	  organizations	  began	  immediately	  and	  dropped	  sharply:	  Between	  1962	  and	  1970,	  the	  yearly	  average	  amount	  of	  aid	  given	  by	  the	  World	  Bank	  and	  Inter-­‐American	  Development	  bank	  was	  $42.2	  million,	  in	  comparison	  to	  $3.9	  million	  between	  1971	  and	  197368.	  	  The	  heavy	  influence	  that	  the	  American	  government	  has	  on	  these	  organizations	  is	  well	  documented,	  and	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Chile,	  the	  impact	  of	  this	  relationship	  was	  devastating.	  	  First	  and	  foremost,	  the	  largest	  single	  problem	  for	  the	  Chilean	  economy	  and,	  more	  broadly,	  Allende’s	  coalition,	  was	  rising	  inflation.	  Inflation	  within	  Chile	  went	  from	  20%	  in	  1971	  to	  78%	  in	  1973,	  a	  staggering	  increase	  that	  was	  paired	  with	  a	  variety	  of	  other	  economic	  concerns69.	  The	  lack	  of	  international	  aid,	  in	  conjunction	  with	  Allende’s	  economic	  policies	  that	  established	  wage	  floors,	  forced	  the	  Chilean	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government	  to	  print	  money	  and,	  as	  a	  result,	  inflation	  spiked70.	  By	  1973,	  inflation	  had	  rose	  to	  over	  350%71.	  	  By	  this	  time,	  it	  had	  become	  clear	  that	  he	  combination	  of	  external	  influences	  on	  the	  economy	  as	  well	  as	  Allende’s	  own	  program	  had	  left	  the	  Chilean	  economy	  in	  shambles.	  	  	  The	  opening	  of	  the	  Paris	  Club	  negotiations	  in	  1972	  was	  a	  clear	  sign	  that	  the	  Chilean	  economy	  was	  in	  trouble.	  These	  negotiations,	  which	  were	  led	  by	  Chile’s	  largest	  creditors	  (the	  U.S.,	  Britain,	  West	  Germany,	  and	  France),	  were	  called	  following	  a	  decision	  by	  the	  Chilean	  government	  to	  “suspend	  payments	  on	  its	  external	  debt.”72	  In	  particular,	  the	  U.S.	  government,	  which	  was	  owed	  roughly	  $1.4	  billion	  in	  debt	  by	  Chile,	  was	  growing	  agitated	  by	  the	  seemingly	  reckless	  policies	  of	  the	  Allende	  administration	  in	  dealing	  with	  the	  economy73.	  As	  a	  result,	  one	  of	  the	  major	  goals	  of	  the	  Paris	  Club	  was	  to	  convince	  the	  Chilean	  government	  to	  sign	  a	  letter	  of	  intent	  that	  “would	  have	  effectively	  constricted	  Allende’s	  implementation	  of	  the	  Basic	  Programme.”74	  However,	  this	  letter	  of	  intent	  never	  was	  signed,	  primarily	  due	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  influence	  used	  by	  the	  American	  government	  to	  convince	  Allende	  to	  agree.	  At	  this	  point	  in	  U.S.-­‐Chilean	  relations,	  the	  Nixon	  Administration	  was	  still	  attempting	  to	  reconcile	  differences	  regarding	  the	  Copper	  industry	  with	  Chilean	  officials	  and	  was	  concerned	  that	  being	  overly	  aggressive	  during	  Paris	  Club	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  70	  Haslam,	  Jonathan,	  The	  Nixon	  Administration	  and	  the	  Death	  of	  Allende’s	  Chile,	  107.	  71	  Hawkins,	  Darren	  G.,	  International	  Human	  Rights	  and	  Authoritarian	  Rule	  in	  Chile,	  72.	  	  72	  Haslam,	  Jonathan,	  The	  Nixon	  Administration	  and	  the	  Death	  of	  Allende’s	  Chile,	  111.	  73	  Ibid.,	  111.	  74	  Ibid.,	  111.	  
	   31	  
negotiations	  would	  have	  repercussions	  on	  American	  investment	  within	  the	  Chilean	  copper	  industry75.	  	  Regardless	  of	  the	  U.S.	  government’s	  lack	  of	  hardline	  action	  during	  the	  Paris	  Club	  negotiations,	  the	  Nixon	  administration	  continued	  to	  pull	  the	  strings	  to	  undermine	  Allende’s	  economic	  and	  political	  program.	  	  One	  of	  the	  most	  effective	  weapons	  within	  Nixon’s	  arsenal	  was	  the	  Central	  Intelligence	  Agency	  and	  its	  heavy	  influence	  within	  the	  American	  embassy	  in	  Santiago.	  In	  a	  comprehensive	  research	  report	  compiled	  by	  Stanford	  Professor	  Richard	  Fagen	  in	  the	  early	  1970’s,	  the	  level	  of	  influence	  that	  the	  CIA	  had	  secured	  within	  the	  Chilean	  political	  system	  was	  revealed.	  In	  this	  report,	  Fagen	  discusses	  various	  conversations	  that	  he	  had	  with	  “a	  U.S.	  Foreign	  Service	  officer”	  in	  which	  it	  was	  revealed	  that	  “one-­‐third	  of	  the	  embassy	  personell	  were	  officers	  of	  the	  CIA”	  and	  that	  the	  CIA	  as	  a	  whole	  had	  infiltrated	  all	  but	  one	  of	  the	  parties	  within	  the	  Popular	  Unity	  coalition76.	  By	  securing	  a	  high	  level	  of	  influence	  and	  access	  to	  the	  Chilean	  political	  system,	  and	  more	  importantly	  Allende’s	  own	  political	  coalition,	  the	  CIA	  was	  able	  to	  more	  effectively	  implement	  devastating	  covert	  economic	  action	  against	  the	  Allende	  regime.	  	  One	  of	  the	  most	  economically	  crippling	  events	  within	  the	  Allende	  era	  was	  a	  45	  day	  long	  strike	  held	  by	  the	  Chilean	  truckers	  union.	  Years	  later,	  it	  would	  be	  revealed	  that	  the	  CIA	  had	  helped	  finance	  this	  strike	  by	  using	  laundered	  money	  through	  various	  backchannels	  and	  third	  parties,	  including	  Christian	  Democratic	  parties	  in	  Europe77.	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Strikes	  like	  the	  one	  mentioned	  above	  became	  commonplace	  by	  1972	  in	  Chile.	  Growing	  economic	  instability	  had	  reached	  a	  level	  that	  not	  only	  frightened	  Chileans	  themselves,	  but	  members	  of	  the	  U.S.	  private	  sector.	  	  Before	  Allende	  even	  won	  the	  election,	  American	  businesses	  and	  businessmen	  began	  implementing	  various	  policies	  and	  procedures	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  reduce	  the	  amount	  of	  economic	  damage	  that	  would	  occur	  if	  he	  were	  to	  win	  the	  election	  and	  successfully	  adopt	  a	  socialist	  model	  for	  Chile.	  One	  of	  the	  best	  examples	  of	  a	  private	  business	  that	  became	  heavily	  invested	  in	  anti-­‐Allende	  efforts	  was	  ITT	  under	  the	  guidance	  of	  its	  president,	  Harold	  Geneen.	  	  ITT	  alone	  donated	  over	  $700,000	  to	  Allende’s	  opponent	  Jorge	  Alessandri	  in	  addition	  to	  $1	  million	  that	  it	  gave	  to	  the	  CIA	  to	  undermine	  Allende’s	  efforts	  to	  win	  the	  1970	  election78.   ITT	  was	  not	  alone,	  however.	  	  The	  United	  States	  business	  community	  as	  a	  whole	  became	  heavily	  involved	  within	  U.S.-­‐Chilean	  economic	  relations	  before,	  during,	  and	  after	  the	  Allende	  era.	  Foreign	  direct	  investment	  to	  Chile	  from	  American	  businesses	  was	  essentially	  eradicated	  following	  Allende’s	  election	  in	  1970.	  In	  addition,	  credit	  access	  to	  Chile	  was	  cut	  off	  by	  banks	  such	  as	  Chase	  Manhattan	  almost	  immediately	  following	  the	  1970	  election79.	  	  The	  Nixon	  administration	  used	  a	  variety	  of	  tactics	  to	  garner	  the	  support	  of	  the	  American	  business	  community	  in	  rallying	  against	  Allende,	  and	  by	  1973,	  U.S.	  private	  sector	  involvement	  in	  the	  crusade	  against	  Allende	  had	  become	  a	  major	  force.	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The	  combination	  of	  private	  sector	  involvement	  and	  Nixonian	  economic	  policy	  aimed	  at	  sabotage	  created	  a	  hostile	  environment	  for	  economic	  growth	  within	  Chile.	  By	  1973,	  this	  environment	  became	  literally	  explosive	  as	  opposition	  leaders,	  foreign	  observers,	  the	  Chilean	  military,	  and	  the	  Chilean	  public	  became	  frustrated	  with	  the	  failed	  policies	  of	  the	  Allende	  regime.	  On	  September	  11th,	  1973,	  the	  Chilean	  military	  conducted	  a	  coup	  d’etat	  that	  left	  Dr.	  Salvador	  Allende	  dead	  and	  the	  Chilean	  government	  at	  the	  hands	  of	  a	  military	  junta.	  Within	  a	  matter	  of	  months,	  this	  junta	  would	  dissolve	  into	  an	  authoritarian	  government	  under	  the	  control	  of	  Augusto	  Pinochet.	  The	  Nixon	  administration	  had	  finally	  gotten	  what	  it	  had	  asked	  for	  with	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Allende	  regime;	  however,	  economic	  relations	  between	  the	  U.S.	  and	  Chile	  would	  only	  become	  more	  complex	  throughout	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  1970s	  and	  1980s.	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Chapter	  2:	  Pinochet’s	  Neoliberal	  Experiment	  
	  	  In	  April	  of	  1975,	  Chilean	  dictator	  Augusto	  Pinochet	  received	  a	  letter	  from	  a	  trusted	  economic	  advisor	  from	  the	  University	  of	  Chicago,	  Milton	  Friedman.	  In	  this	  letter,	  Friedman	  proposed	  a	  series	  of	  neoliberal	  economic	  policies	  that	  ought	  to	  be	  implemented	  in	  Chile	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  collapse	  of	  the	  economy	  and	  state.	  The	  interaction	  between	  Friedman	  and	  Pinochet	  throughout	  the	  1970s	  was	  turbulent	  and	  characterized	  by	  serious	  discussions	  regarding	  intense	  and	  severe	  economic	  policies.	  It	  would	  be	  difficult	  for	  any	  historian	  to	  summarize	  Pinochet’s	  and	  Friedman’s	  neoliberal	  experiment	  in	  Chile	  in	  a	  single	  sentence.	  However,	  in	  the	  April	  21st	  letter,	  Friedman	  was	  able	  to	  summarize	  exactly	  what	  type	  of	  economic	  policies	  Pinochet	  needed	  to	  implement	  and	  why:	  	   Some	  forty	  years	  ago	  Chile,	  like	  many	  another	  country,	  including	  my	  own,	  got	  off	  on	  the	  wrong	  track	  –	  for	  good	  reasons,	  not	  bad,	  because	  of	  the	  mistakes	  of	  good	  men	  not	  bad.	  The	  major	  error,	  in	  my	  opinion,	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was	  to	  envision	  the	  government	  as	  the	  solver	  of	  all	  problems,	  to	  believe	  that	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  do	  good	  with	  other	  people’s	  money80.	  	  This	  excerpt,	  taken	  from	  a	  letter	  written	  from	  Friedman	  to	  Pinochet,	  shows	  the	  key	  element	  of	  neoliberal	  economic	  theory	  –	  the	  economic	  model	  that	  Friedman	  helped	  make	  famous	  in	  the	  late	  20th	  century.	  The	  growing	  opinion	  that	  government	  interaction	  in	  the	  economy	  was	  dangerous	  helped	  put	  this	  economic	  theory	  in	  the	  limelight	  and	  solidify	  its	  place	  in	  the	  history	  books.	  	  Throughout	  U.S.	  history,	  foreign	  policy	  has	  been	  shaped	  by	  a	  variety	  of	  individuals,	  interests,	  and	  theories	  about	  how	  to	  achieve	  certain	  goals.	  In	  the	  1970s	  and	  1980s,	  U.S.	  economic	  policy	  directed	  toward	  Chile	  was	  indeed	  shaped	  by	  all	  three	  of	  these	  factors.	  Individuals	  such	  as	  Richard	  Nixon,	  Henry	  Kissinger,	  Jimmy	  Carter,	  Gerald	  Ford,	  and	  Augusto	  Pinochet	  all	  played	  key	  roles	  in	  directing	  U.S.	  economic	  policy.	  As	  far	  as	  interests	  were	  concerned,	  the	  primary	  objective	  for	  the	  U.S.	  government	  at	  the	  time	  was	  containing	  communism,	  proliferating	  democratic	  principles,	  and	  supporting	  U.S.	  allies	  in	  various	  parts	  of	  the	  world	  that	  were	  deemed	  significant	  enough	  to	  receive	  aid.	  	  In	  this	  chapter,	  I	  will	  explore	  the	  extent	  of	  the	  aforementioned	  individuals	  and	  the	  various	  objectives	  of	  the	  United	  States	  government	  at	  the	  time.	  However,	  my	  focus	  will	  be	  on	  the	  theory	  that	  many	  of	  these	  individuals	  followed	  in	  order	  to	  achieve	  said	  goals:	  neoliberal	  economic	  theory.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  80	  Klein,	  Naomi.	  “Letter	  to	  General	  Pinochet	  on	  Our	  Return	  from	  Chile	  and	  His	  Reply”	  www.naomiklein.org/files/resources/pdfs/friedman-­‐pinochet-­‐letters.pdf	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  Accessed	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Through	  an	  examination	  of	  neoliberal	  economic	  theory	  generally	  and	  how	  it	  applies	  to	  U.S.	  policy	  toward	  Chile	  in	  the	  1970s	  and	  1980s	  more	  specifically,	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  neoliberal	  economic	  theory	  played	  a	  significant	  role	  in	  setting	  the	  stage	  for	  economic,	  social,	  and	  political	  development	  for	  Chile.	  Through	  a	  detailed	  explanation	  of	  neoliberal	  economic	  theory,	  I	  will	  explain	  that	  the	  austerity	  measures	  and	  stabilization	  tactics	  were	  successful	  and	  benefitted	  Chile	  in	  the	  long	  run	  but	  the	  rapid	  adoption	  of	  radical	  free	  market	  economic	  principles	  led	  to	  a	  deterioration	  of	  the	  Chilean	  economy	  which	  caused	  a	  collapse	  of	  political	  discourse.	  It	  was	  not	  until	  after	  the	  1982	  debt	  crisis	  when	  more	  reasonable	  programs	  were	  installed	  that	  Chile	  saw	  relative	  economic	  stability.	  One	  of	  the	  most	  important	  factors	  that	  directly	  led	  to	  the	  solidification	  of	  neoliberalism	  as	  a	  legitimate	  economic	  theory	  in	  the	  United	  States	  was	  the	  global	  recession	  that	  took	  place	  in	  the	  early	  1970s81.	  	  Shortly	  following	  this	  recession	  came	  the	  oil	  crisis	  in	  1973	  which	  exacerbated	  critical	  problems	  throughout	  the	  global	  economy82.	  The	  rise	  in	  economic	  turmoil	  created	  a	  situation	  in	  which	  it	  was	  clear	  that	  a	  new	  system	  of	  economic	  relations	  was	  necessary	  –	  both	  for	  economic	  and	  political	  reasons.	  	  The	  1970s	  was	  a	  time	  in	  which	  many	  social,	  political,	  and	  economic	  concerns	  collided	  and	  created	  a	  chaotic	  situation	  for	  American	  policymakers.	  Military	  failures	  in	  Vietnam,	  social	  revolution	  at	  home,	  and	  economic	  turmoil	  both	  in	  the	  United	  States	  and	  abroad	  were	  only	  some	  of	  the	  factors	  that	  played	  into	  changing	  U.S.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  81	  Harvey,	  David,	  “Neoliberalism	  as	  Creative	  Destruction,”	  Annals	  of	  the	  American	  
Academy	  of	  Political	  and	  Social	  Science,	  Vol.	  610,	  NAFTA	  and	  Beyond:	  Alternative	  Perspectives	  in	  the	  Study	  of	  Global	  Trade	  and	  Development	  (Mar.,	  2007),	  pp.	  27.	  	  82	  Ibid.,	  27.	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policy.	  However,	  the	  most	  important	  single	  event	  that	  transformed	  U.S.	  economic	  policy	  toward	  Chile	  during	  this	  time	  was	  the	  rise	  of	  free	  market	  principles	  through	  the	  gaining	  popularity	  of	  neoliberal	  economic	  theory83.	  	  Following	  the	  economic	  problems	  of	  the	  early	  1970s,	  the	  American	  public,	  along	  with	  a	  substantial	  amount	  of	  economists,	  policymakers,	  and	  politicians,	  started	  to	  see	  the	  state’s	  role	  in	  economic	  issues	  as	  unnecessary	  and	  potentially	  dangerous84.	  Instead	  of	  seeing	  “government	  social	  provision	  and	  economic	  management”	  as	  a	  force	  of	  good,	  many	  people	  throughout	  America	  began	  to	  see	  the	  government	  as	  a	  force	  of	  economic	  evil	  and,	  in	  turn,	  began	  to	  support	  policies	  of	  deregulation,	  privatization,	  and	  lower	  taxes85.	  Journalist	  Robert	  Kuttner	  called	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  neoliberal	  economic	  model	  in	  the	  1970’s	  as	  “the	  intellectual	  counterrevolution	  of	  the	  1970s”	  and	  argued	  that	  this	  shift	  in	  economic	  ideology	  was	  marked	  by	  an	  enthusiasm	  for	  “a	  pure	  free-­‐market	  economy.”86	  With	  the	  U.S.	  changing	  its	  stance	  on	  economic	  policy	  when	  it	  came	  to	  global	  economic	  relations,	  it	  was	  only	  a	  matter	  of	  time	  until	  organizations	  such	  as	  the	  WTO	  and	  the	  IMF	  also	  changed	  their	  policies.	  This	  is	  one	  of	  the	  most	  critical	  elements	  of	  the	  surge	  in	  neoliberal	  economic	  policy	  throughout	  the	  developing	  world.	  	  With	  organizations	  that	  specialized	  in	  providing	  aid	  and	  debt	  relief	  programs	  to	  developing	  nations	  on	  the	  same	  side	  as	  neoliberal	  policymakers,	  nations	  who	  wished	  to	  receive	  international	  loans	  or	  aid	  had	  little	  choice	  but	  to	  adopt	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  83	  Borstelmann,	  Thomas,	  The	  1970s.	  Princeton,	  New	  Jersey:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  2012.	  215.	  84	  Ibid.,	  215.	  	  85	  Ibid.,	  215.	  	  86	  Borstelmann,	  The	  1970s,	  127.	  	  
	   38	  
neoliberal	  model	  of	  economic	  reform:	  As	  David	  Harvey	  argues,	  “All	  states	  that	  sign	  on	  to	  the	  WTO	  and	  the	  IMF…agree	  to	  abide…	  by	  these	  rules	  or	  face	  severe	  penalties.”87	  The	  choice	  (or	  lack	  of	  choice)	  by	  developing	  nations	  to	  accept	  neoliberal	  economic	  reform	  policies	  occurred	  in	  this	  way.	  But	  what	  exactly	  did	  these	  reform	  policies	  entail?	  For	  most	  nations,	  the	  neoliberal	  reform	  packages	  centered	  around	  three	  major	  components:	  stabilization,	  structural	  adjustment,	  and	  export-­‐led	  growth88.	  Stabilization	  was	  a	  clear	  and	  obvious	  choice	  for	  economic	  reformers	  dealing	  with	  developing	  nations	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  20th	  century.	  The	  primary	  way	  to	  stabilize	  an	  economy,	  through	  the	  eyes	  of	  the	  neoliberal	  policy	  maker,	  is	  to	  curb	  inflation.	  In	  order	  to	  curb	  inflation,	  domestic	  economic	  policy	  makers	  must	  decrease	  the	  money	  supply,	  usually	  by	  increasing	  interest	  rates	  and	  decreasing	  government	  spending89.	  These	  tactics	  were	  usually	  referred	  to	  as	  “austerity	  measures”	  and	  were	  seen	  as	  a	  vital	  component	  of	  neoliberal	  reform.	  	  The	  primary	  objective	  behind	  structural	  adjustment	  is	  to	  create	  an	  economic	  system	  that	  is	  conducive	  to	  foreign	  direct	  investment,	  free	  market	  principles,	  and	  without	  “artificial	  distortions	  such	  as	  price	  controls	  or	  trade	  tariffs.”90	  By	  implementing	  policies	  such	  as	  deregulation,	  domestic	  economists	  can,	  at	  least	  in	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  Ibid.,	  23	  88	  Green,	  Duncan,	  Silent	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  Rise	  and	  Crisis	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  Market	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theory,	  create	  the	  conditions	  for	  economic	  freedom	  and	  growth	  through	  increased	  trade	  and	  investment.	  	  Finally,	  the	  concept	  of	  export-­‐led	  growth	  is	  heavily	  dependent	  upon	  the	  idea	  that	  foreign	  direct	  investment	  is	  one	  of	  the	  most	  integral	  parts	  of	  a	  growing	  and	  successful	  economy.	  By	  highlighting	  the	  importance	  of	  exports,	  neoliberal	  economists	  encourage	  nations	  to	  open	  up	  their	  markets	  to	  international	  competition	  and	  demand91.	  By	  doing	  so,	  these	  economies	  are	  forced	  to	  compete	  through	  the	  production	  of	  higher-­‐quality	  goods	  that	  are	  in-­‐demand.	  	  Together,	  these	  three	  components	  of	  economic	  reform	  came	  together	  to	  constitute	  the	  bulk	  of	  neoliberal	  economic	  transformation	  in	  the	  developing	  world.	  Beyond	  the	  IMF	  and	  WTO,	  however,	  other	  actors	  played	  a	  fundamental	  role	  in	  proliferating	  neoliberal	  economic	  policy	  and	  reform.	  For	  Chile	  specifically,	  economists	  trained	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Chicago	  traveled	  to	  Santiago	  in	  droves	  to	  work	  in	  government	  positions	  following	  the	  1973	  coup	  d’état.	  These	  individuals,	  named	  the	  “Chicago	  Boys,”	  played	  a	  vital	  role	  in	  the	  coming	  years	  in	  supporting	  market-­‐driven	  economic	  reform	  throughout	  Chile	  and	  Latin	  America92.	  	  However,	  the	  goals	  of	  the	  Chicago	  Boys	  were	  not	  limited	  to	  economic	  success.	  Instead,	  these	  economists	  believed	  that	  through	  the	  extension	  of	  economic	  liberties,	  political	  freedoms	  would	  shortly	  follow.	  It	  was	  through	  this	  belief	  that	  neoliberal	  economic	  theory	  quickly	  became	  tied	  to	  democratic	  principles	  and	  discourse93.	  By	  encouraging	  strict	  limits	  on	  government	  spending	  along	  with	  other	  reform	  efforts,	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these	  economists	  were	  confident	  in	  their	  ability	  to	  decrease	  inflation	  and	  “bring	  Latin	  American	  currencies	  more	  in	  sync	  with	  world	  markets”	  which	  would	  lead	  to	  greater	  social	  and	  political	  freedoms94.	  	  	   Immediately	  following	  the	  1973	  coup,	  the	  military	  Junta,	  led	  by	  Augusto	  Pinochet,	  turned	  to	  the	  Chicago	  Boys	  and	  other	  technocrats	  and	  advisors	  to	  craft	  and	  implement	  social	  policy.	  According	  to	  Orlando	  Letelier,	  an	  advisor	  to	  Allende	  who	  later	  played	  an	  influential	  role	  in	  convincing	  the	  United	  States	  Congress	  to	  decrease	  aid	  to	  Chile,	  these	  Chicago	  Boys	  constituted	  the	  actual	  ruling	  aspect	  of	  the	  government	  whereas	  the	  military	  did	  the	  enforcing:	  “The	  ‘Chicago	  Boys,’	  convinced	  the	  generals	  that	  they	  were	  prepared	  to	  supplement	  the	  brutality,	  which	  the	  military	  possessed,	  with	  the	  intellectual	  assets	  it	  lacked.”95	  	   In	  turn,	  the	  Chicago	  Boys	  were	  influenced	  by	  the	  United	  States	  government	  in	  order	  to	  help	  achieve	  economic	  and	  political	  goals	  within	  Chile.	  The	  Nixon	  Administration	  perceived	  that	  the	  fate	  of	  the	  Chilean	  government	  and	  economy	  could	  not	  be	  left	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  Pinochet	  and	  a	  handful	  of	  advisors.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  CIA	  worked	  tirelessly	  in	  the	  months	  leading	  up	  to	  the	  1973	  coup	  d’état	  to	  prepare	  a	  “how	  to”	  manual	  explaining	  how	  and	  what	  the	  military	  should	  do	  when	  they	  overthrew	  Allende.	  	  From	  the	  early	  days	  of	  the	  military	  junta,	  following	  the	  overthrow	  of	  Allende,	  the	  policies	  and	  procedures	  of	  the	  Chilean	  government	  came	  largely	  from	  a	  document	  referred	  to	  by	  the	  CIA	  as	  “The	  Brick.”96	  This	  five	  hundred	  page	  long	  document	  was	  compiled	  by	  both	  Chicago	  Boys	  and	  CIA	  collaborators	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  94	  Ibid.,	  71.	  	  95	  Orlando	  Letelier,	  “The	  Chicago	  Boys	  in	  Chile:	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focused	  primarily	  on	  the	  economic	  program	  that	  the	  technocrats	  in	  Chile	  wanted	  the	  military	  Junta	  to	  enact	  immediately	  following	  the	  coup97.	  Out	  of	  the	  ten	  major	  contributors	  to	  “The	  Brick,”	  eight	  of	  them	  had	  studied	  economics	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Chicago98.	  Although	  	  	   Another	  actor	  that	  played	  a	  vital	  role	  in	  influencing	  the	  neoliberal	  reform	  in	  Chile	  was	  Professor	  Milton	  Friedman,	  the	  economist	  who	  arguably	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  the	  founder	  of	  the	  Chicago	  Boys.	  Throughout	  the	  1970s,	  Friedman	  was	  both	  a	  professor	  of	  economics	  and	  a	  confidant	  and	  economic	  advisor	  for	  Augusto	  Pinochet.	  He	  promoted	  a	  rapid-­‐fire	  capitalist	  transformation	  by	  way	  of	  neoliberal	  economic	  reform.	  His	  tireless	  promotion	  of	  such	  vigorous	  and	  extreme	  economic	  reform	  came	  to	  be	  known	  as	  “shock	  therapy”	  and	  became	  a	  model	  for	  a	  variety	  of	  economies	  since99.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Chile,	  Friedman	  believed	  that	  the	  economic	  adjustment	  from	  Allende	  to	  Pinochet	  would	  be	  possible	  due	  to	  the	  “speed,	  suddenness,	  and	  scope	  of	  the	  economic	  shifts.”100	  	   Trusting	  in	  Friedman	  and	  his	  cadre	  of	  economic	  advisors,	  Pinochet	  dove	  deep	  into	  the	  pool	  of	  neoliberal	  reform.	  From	  1973	  until	  1975,	  the	  Chilean	  dictator	  enacted	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  domestic	  economic	  programs	  that	  ranged	  from	  the	  privatization	  of	  previously	  state-­‐owned	  businesses	  to	  the	  opening	  of	  trade	  relations	  with	  the	  global	  economy101.	  These	  measures,	  in	  conjunction	  with	  a	  10%	  cut	  in	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government	  spending	  and	  the	  removal	  of	  price	  controls,	  was	  a	  sign	  that	  Pinochet	  was	  playing	  directly	  out	  of	  the	  Chicago	  Boy	  playbook.	  	  	  It	  soon	  became	  clear,	  however,	  that	  this	  strategy	  was	  not	  exactly	  as	  successful	  as	  he	  had	  hoped.	  	  	   As	  a	  result	  of	  Pinochet’s	  strict	  neoliberal	  and	  free-­‐market	  policies,	  the	  Chilean	  economy	  took	  a	  turn	  for	  the	  worse.	  Inflation	  rose,	  local	  businesses	  were	  forced	  to	  close	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  increased	  international	  competition,	  unemployment	  rose,	  and	  the	  cost	  of	  simple	  goods	  such	  as	  bread	  went	  through	  the	  roof102.	  Fearing	  that	  their	  experiment	  had	  lost	  its	  way,	  the	  Chicago	  Boys,	  in	  conjunction	  with	  Milton	  Friedman	  (who	  flew	  to	  Santiago	  in	  March	  1975),	  met	  with	  Pinochet	  and	  explained	  that	  in	  order	  for	  the	  economic	  policy	  to	  work,	  the	  government	  needed	  to	  embrace	  true	  free	  market	  principles	  and	  practices	  “with	  greater	  abandon.”103	  Even	  Pinochet,	  who	  was	  apparently	  a	  proponent	  of	  neoliberal	  reform,	  was	  concerned	  about	  the	  short-­‐term	  effects	  of	  such	  transformative	  economic	  policy:	  Friedman	  wrote	  in	  his	  memoirs	  later	  that	  Pinochet	  “was	  sympathetically	  attracted	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  shock	  treatment	  but	  was	  clearly	  distressed	  at	  the	  possible	  temporary	  unemployment	  that	  might	  be	  caused.”104	  	  	   Despite	  the	  deterioration	  of	  the	  Chilean	  economy,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  identify	  exactly	  what	  elements	  of	  neoliberal	  economic	  theory	  that	  caused	  the	  downturn.	  As	  previously	  explained,	  the	  reforms	  to	  promote	  austerity	  and	  stabilization	  were	  critical	  elements	  of	  the	  neoliberal	  program	  in	  Chile.	  These	  reforms	  were	  successful	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in	  cutting	  government	  expenditures	  and	  reigning	  in	  the	  high	  levels	  of	  inflation	  and	  promoting	  higher	  levels	  of	  growth	  than	  many	  other	  Latin	  American	  nations105.	  By	  1978,	  inflation	  was	  roughly	  30%	  (down	  from	  500%	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  coup)	  and	  economic	  growth	  averaged	  7%	  between	  1976	  and	  1981106.	  	  	  	   The	  problem	  that	  occurred	  with	  Pinochet’s	  neoliberal	  experiment	  was	  his	  decision	  to	  rapidly	  increase	  the	  Chilean	  economy’s	  exposure	  to	  the	  global	  marketplace.	  As	  a	  result,	  many	  of	  the	  fledgling	  businesses	  within	  Chile	  had	  to	  quickly	  adapt	  to	  the	  higher	  level	  of	  international	  competition.	  Furthermore,	  wage	  levels	  decreased	  tremendously,	  and	  the	  state	  withdrew	  many	  of	  its	  social	  services	  that	  lead	  to	  social	  unrest	  throughout	  the	  country107.	  	  The	  decision	  to	  immediately	  reduce	  tariff	  protection	  and	  increase	  international	  exposure	  was	  the	  fatal	  flaw	  of	  Pinochet’s	  neoliberal	  economic	  policy.	  It	  is	  integral	  to	  separate	  this	  poor	  decision	  from	  the	  successes	  that	  austerity	  and	  stabilization	  measures	  experienced.	  	  	   In	  Washington,	  policymakers	  were	  trying	  to	  figure	  out	  the	  best	  way	  possible	  to	  create	  an	  economically	  powerful	  ally	  in	  Santiago.	  As	  stated	  previously,	  the	  Nixon	  Administration	  approached	  the	  Cold	  War	  with	  a	  one-­‐track	  mind	  that	  pitted	  capitalists	  against	  communists,	  good	  against	  evil.	  However,	  the	  authoritarian	  nature	  of	  the	  Pinochet	  regime	  caused	  a	  problem	  in	  this	  distinction.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  severe	  nature	  of	  Pinochet’s	  authoritarianism	  classified	  the	  Chilean	  government	  as	  both	  good	  (due	  to	  the	  pro-­‐American	  nature	  of	  the	  Chilean	  economic	  structure)	  and	  bad	  (because	  of	  the	  massive	  human	  rights	  and	  democratic	  rights	  violations	  that	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were	  occurring)	  during	  the	  Nixon	  administration.	  The	  human	  rights	  abuses	  that	  were	  occurring	  in	  Chile	  were	  a	  liability	  for	  the	  Nixon	  Administration	  due	  to	  activism	  both	  within	  Congress	  and	  non-­‐governmental	  organizations	  (NGOs).	  	  This	  political	  disconnect	  between	  the	  legislative	  and	  executive	  branches	  of	  the	  American	  government	  was	  one	  of	  the	  reasons	  that	  a	  comprehensive	  and	  consistent	  economic	  strategy	  toward	  Chile	  during	  the	  1970s.	  	  	   Despite	  the	  controversy	  that	  circled	  the	  September	  1973	  coup	  that	  overthrew	  Allende,	  President	  Richard	  Nixon	  wasted	  little	  time	  in	  solidifying	  relations	  with	  the	  new	  military	  regime108.	  He	  did	  this	  by	  primarily	  providing	  a	  substantial	  amount	  of	  military	  and	  monetary	  aid	  to	  Chile.	  	  Immediately	  after	  the	  coup,	  the	  military	  Junta	  requested	  and	  received	  “one	  thousand	  flares	  and	  one	  thousand	  steel	  helmets”	  for	  the	  Chilean	  army	  so	  that	  the	  Junta	  could	  quell	  any	  domestic	  resistance	  to	  the	  coup109.	  In	  addition,	  within	  two	  months	  of	  the	  coup,	  Nixon	  had	  approved	  $48	  million	  in	  commodity	  credits	  to	  Chile	  so	  that	  the	  regime	  could	  purchase	  grain	  and	  corn	  –	  this	  amount	  was	  nearly	  eight	  times	  larger	  than	  all	  of	  the	  commodity	  credit	  given	  to	  Allende	  combined110111.	  	   The	  large	  levels	  of	  aid	  during	  the	  first	  few	  months	  following	  the	  coup	  were	  the	  start	  to	  a	  new	  relationship	  between	  Washington	  and	  Santiago.	  Over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  Nixon	  and	  Ford	  presidencies,	  the	  U.S.	  government	  would	  continue	  to	  funnel	  aid	  to	  Pinochet	  while	  simultaneously	  attempting	  to	  encourage	  the	  U.S.	  private	  sector	  to	  increase	  investment	  and	  stop	  Congress	  from	  putting	  limits	  on	  the	  amount	  of	  aid	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that	  could	  be	  given.	  By	  1972,	  foreign	  aid	  requests	  from	  Latin	  America	  were	  the	  highest	  single	  category.	  Requests	  for	  economic	  assistance	  alone	  was	  $572	  million,	  with	  smaller	  requests	  in	  other	  areas,	  bringing	  the	  total	  to	  $658	  million.	  With	  a	  GDP	  in	  1972	  of	  just	  over	  $10	  billion,	  Chile’s	  request	  accounted	  for	  roughly	  6.5%	  of	  its	  GDP.	  	  The	  next	  highest	  country/region	  requesting	  foreign	  aid	  was	  Vietnam	  with	  a	  total	  of	  $647	  million112.	  Although	  Nixon	  clearly	  did	  not	  see	  Latin	  America	  as	  important	  as	  Vietnam	  during	  this	  time,	  the	  amount	  of	  aid	  given	  to	  each	  region	  respectively	  shows	  that	  there	  was	  a	  significant	  amount	  of	  energy	  being	  spent	  on	  keeping	  the	  Latin	  American	  nations	  pro-­‐America	  or	  at	  the	  very	  least,	  anti-­‐Communist.	  The	  attempt	  to	  increase	  economic	  and	  political	  relations	  with	  Chile	  by	  the	  United	  States	  government	  was	  an	  attempt	  to	  address	  this	  issue.	  But	  Nixon	  and,	  more	  importantly,	  National	  Security	  Advisor	  Henry	  Kissinger,	  knew	  that	  the	  Chilean	  problem	  could	  not	  simply	  be	  fixed	  by	  loans	  and	  aid	  from	  the	  government.	  The	  private	  sector	  would	  have	  to	  get	  involved.	  	  	   Indeed,	  Kissinger,	  President	  Nixon’s	  National	  Security	  Advisor,	  played	  a	  vital	  role	  in	  the	  crafting	  of	  U.S.	  policy	  toward	  Chile	  during	  the	  1970s.	  In	  particular,	  he	  supported	  the	  creation	  and	  strengthening	  of	  three	  areas	  of	  Nixonian	  policy:	  U.S.	  private	  sector	  investment	  to	  foreign	  nations,	  the	  bolstering	  of	  U.S.	  aid	  programs,	  and	  the	  support	  of	  aid	  to	  Chile	  despite	  human	  rights	  violations113.	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  pp.	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   Kissinger	  made	  it	  clear	  that	  “the	  U.S.	  foreign	  aid	  program	  [was]	  in	  major	  crisis”	  and	  needed	  to	  be	  reevaluated	  by	  the	  White	  House114.	  In	  referencing	  Latin	  America	  specifically,	  he	  argued	  that	  U.S.	  aid	  was	  crucial	  in	  order	  to	  maintain	  relations	  and	  that	  Nixon	  would	  have	  to	  lobby	  aggressively	  in	  order	  to	  achieve	  higher	  levels	  of	  aid	  from	  Congress.	  Furthermore,	  Kissinger	  acknowledged	  the	  fact	  that	  economic	  development	  of	  countries	  like	  Chile	  could	  not	  occur	  without	  a	  combination	  of	  private	  sector	  investment	  and	  “resource	  transfer	  on	  [the	  U.S.	  government’s]	  part.”115	  	   Kissinger’s	  theory	  on	  private	  sector	  investment	  to	  developing	  nations	  was	  appealing	  to	  Nixon.	  Throughout	  his	  time	  in	  office,	  Nixon	  worked	  with	  various	  leaders	  of	  the	  U.S.	  business	  community	  (including	  Nelson	  Rockefeller)	  to	  help	  establish	  a	  better	  relationship	  with	  members	  of	  the	  political	  and	  economic	  elite	  in	  countries	  such	  as	  Chile116.	  	  By	  building	  and	  maintaining	  these	  relationships,	  Nixon	  was	  able	  to	  make	  sure	  that	  a	  certain	  level	  of	  aid	  could	  be	  given	  to	  America’s	  allies	  even	  if	  Congress	  put	  caps	  on	  government	  aid	  (which	  happened	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Chile,	  and	  will	  be	  discussed	  later).	  	  	   In	  order	  to	  make	  sure	  that	  this	  strategy	  of	  private	  sector	  investment	  would	  pay	  off,	  Nixon	  employed	  tactics	  outlined	  in	  a	  meeting	  of	  the	  National	  Security	  Council	  in	  late	  March	  1969117.	  	  In	  an	  “analytic	  summary”	  of	  this	  meeting,	  Kissinger	  outlined	  his	  opinions	  on	  encouraging	  private	  sector	  investment	  in	  the	  Least	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Developed	  Countries,	  (LDCs)	  that	  were	  seen	  as	  U.S.	  allies:	  “we	  could	  actively	  promote	  increased	  U.S.	  private	  investment	  in	  the	  LDCs,	  by	  providing	  tax	  incentives	  or	  removing	  some	  of	  the	  constraints	  of	  existing	  government	  programs.”118	  	   In	  addition	  to	  the	  aforementioned	  tactics,	  Nixon	  established	  the	  Overseas	  Private	  Investment	  Corporation	  (OPIC)	  through	  an	  amendment	  of	  the	  Foreign	  Assistance	  Act	  in	  1969.	  This	  entity,	  suggested	  by	  Nelson	  Rockefeller	  in	  The	  
Rockefeller	  Report	  on	  the	  Americas,	  was	  established	  in	  order	  to	  bring	  U.S.	  national	  interests	  together	  with	  U.S.	  private	  investment	  by	  finding	  and	  investing	  in	  emerging	  markets119.	  OPIC	  remains	  active	  today	  and	  still	  is	  reflective	  of	  the	  concerns	  that	  U.S.	  government	  aid	  and	  loans	  were	  less	  effective	  than	  the	  same	  time	  of	  monetary	  assistance	  that	  could	  be	  gained	  through	  private	  investment.120	  	   Nixon’s	  employment	  of	  these	  tactics,	  however,	  was	  simply	  not	  enough	  to	  keep	  the	  Chilean	  economy	  from	  failing	  in	  the	  mid	  1970s.	  The	  repressive	  element	  of	  the	  Pinochet	  regime	  overpowered	  the	  attractiveness	  of	  the	  free-­‐market	  policies	  that	  were	  enacted	  there121.	  Despite	  significant	  efforts	  by	  Pinochet	  and	  his	  economic	  advisors	  to	  employ	  strong	  neoliberal	  policies	  within	  the	  Chilean	  economy,	  U.S.	  investors	  saw	  the	  authoritarian	  side	  of	  the	  government	  too	  unstable	  and	  likely	  to	  produce	  “unrest,	  violence,	  and	  abrupt	  (and	  unforeseeable)	  political	  changes.”122	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   In	  addition	  to	  Henry	  Kissinger,	  the	  Director	  of	  the	  Office	  of	  Management	  and	  Budget	  George	  P.	  Schultz	  proved	  to	  be	  an	  invaluable	  asset	  to	  Nixon	  in	  fighting	  for	  executive	  control	  over	  aid	  levels123.	  As	  an	  advisor	  to	  Nixon	  with	  extensive	  knowledge	  regarding	  the	  budgeting	  and	  appropriations	  process,	  Schultz	  became	  a	  figurehead	  in	  Washington	  who	  was	  particularly	  supportive	  of	  Nixon’s	  ability	  to	  control	  the	  U.S.	  government’s	  aid	  programs:	  “my	  chief	  concern	  is	  Presidential	  influence	  over	  development	  assistance	  programs.”124	  	   It	  was	  through	  efforts	  like	  this	  that	  Nixon	  attempted	  to	  wrestle	  budgeting	  control	  back	  to	  the	  executive.	  Although	  Congress	  won	  substantial	  victories	  like	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Kennedy	  Amendment,	  the	  White	  House	  was	  able	  to	  maintain	  high	  contribution	  levels	  to	  organizations	  such	  as	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  Development	  Bank,	  World	  Bank,	  and	  IMF125.	  	  According	  to	  Kissinger,	  Nixon’s	  ability	  to	  funnel	  federal	  money	  into	  these	  programs,	  in	  conjunction	  with	  organizations	  such	  as	  OPIC,	  was	  “the	  most	  concrete	  demonstration	  of	  [his]	  deep	  interest	  in	  development	  in	  Latin	  America.”126	  	   Despite	  the	  various	  budgeting	  victories	  by	  the	  Nixon	  and	  Ford	  Administrations	  in	  the	  mid	  1970s,	  the	  Chilean	  economy	  continued	  to	  suffer.	  As	  previously	  stated,	  the	  programs	  introduced	  by	  the	  Chicago	  Boys	  immediately	  after	  the	  coup	  in	  1973	  produced	  unfavorable	  results	  for	  the	  Chilean	  economy.	  As	  a	  result,	  in	  1975,	  Pinochet	  and	  the	  Chilean	  Finance	  Ministry	  flew	  down	  a	  variety	  of	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economists	  from	  the	  University	  of	  Chicago	  to	  reevaluate	  the	  economic	  situation,	  including	  Milton	  Friedman.127	  	   The	  economic	  decisions	  that	  followed	  proved	  disastrous	  for	  the	  Chilean	  economy.	  According	  to	  Friedman	  and	  his	  colleagues,	  a	  more	  full	  embrace	  of	  free-­‐market	  principles	  would	  lead	  to	  a	  rapid	  turn-­‐around	  of	  the	  stagnant	  Chilean	  economy.	  However,	  the	  far-­‐reaching	  austerity	  measures	  did	  exactly	  the	  opposite	  and	  the	  economy	  experienced	  a	  sharp	  downturn128.	  During	  this	  time,	  GDP	  contracted	  by	  14.4%	  and	  unemployment	  peaked	  at	  15%.	  Finally,	  and	  arguably	  most	  important	  to	  understanding	  the	  demise	  of	  the	  neoliberal	  model,	  the	  manufacturing	  sector,	  “whose	  advancement	  was	  the	  staple	  of	  structuralist	  development	  strategy,”	  took	  a	  nosedive	  and	  would	  not	  fully	  recover	  until	  1987129.	  	   The	  combination	  of	  the	  economic	  downturn	  and	  the	  election	  Jimmy	  Carter	  into	  the	  White	  House	  turned	  the	  late	  1970s	  into	  a	  tumultuous	  era	  for	  U.S.-­‐Chilean	  relations.	  Not	  only	  were	  the	  economic	  relations	  strained,	  but	  also	  political	  relations	  became	  increasingly	  tense.	  Following	  the	  assassination	  of	  Orlando	  Letelier,	  the	  former	  Allende	  cabinet	  member	  and	  Congressional	  activist	  against	  U.S.	  funding	  to	  Pinochet’s	  Chile,	  in	  Washington	  D.C.	  in	  1976	  by	  Chilean	  secret	  service	  agents,	  the	  White	  House	  and	  U.S.	  Congress	  took	  steps	  to	  distance	  the	  U.S.	  government	  from	  Pinochet130.	  This,	  in	  addition	  to	  Carter’s	  explicit	  condemnation	  of	  the	  human	  rights	  violations	  occurring	  at	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  Pinochet	  regime,	  helped	  create	  a	  situation	  in	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which	  U.S.-­‐Chilean	  relations	  were	  the	  most	  strained	  since	  Allende	  (and	  arguably	  more	  so).	  	  	  	   The	  domestic	  policies	  of	  the	  Chilean	  government	  at	  that	  time	  were	  not	  helpful	  in	  restoring	  American	  confidence	  in	  the	  country’s	  political	  structure	  or	  economy.	  Taking	  advantage	  of	  the	  hyper	  anti-­‐communism	  that	  pervaded	  American	  policymakers	  during	  the	  Cold	  War,	  Pinochet	  and	  his	  advisors	  largely	  ignored	  Carter’s	  attempts	  to	  diplomatically	  change	  Chilean	  domestic	  policy	  by	  arguing	  “that	  Washington	  was	  deviating	  from	  its	  own	  national	  interest…therefore	  there	  was	  no	  need	  to	  listen	  to	  it;	  sooner	  or	  later	  the	  United	  States	  would	  come	  it	  its	  senses.”131	  It	  would	  not	  be	  until	  the	  election	  of	  Ronald	  Reagan	  in	  1980	  that	  U.S.-­‐Chilean	  relations	  would	  return	  to	  its	  pre-­‐Carter	  levels	  of	  aid	  and	  political	  assistance.	  	  	   The	  1970s	  were	  a	  complicated	  era	  in	  terms	  of	  U.S.-­‐Chilean	  relations.	  	  While	  U.S.	  policymakers	  and	  Chileans	  who	  were	  educated	  in	  America	  attempted	  to	  install	  neoliberal	  market	  reform,	  the	  repressive	  and	  violent	  nature	  of	  the	  Pinochet	  government	  hindered	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  Chilean	  economy	  to	  grow.	  Despite	  clear	  successes	  following	  the	  installment	  of	  austerity	  measures	  and	  reforms	  aimed	  at	  stabilization,	  Pinochet’s	  decision	  to	  aggressively	  expose	  the	  Chilean	  economy	  to	  international	  pressure	  dealt	  a	  death	  blow	  to	  economic	  growth	  in	  Chile.	  Neoliberalism	  in	  Chile	  was	  not	  doomed	  from	  the	  beginning	  –	  it	  was	  the	  unforgiving	  and	  belligerent	  nature	  of	  General	  Augusto	  Pinochet	  that	  killed	  Chile’s	  chance	  at	  fostering	  a	  successful	  free	  market	  economy	  during	  the	  1970s	  and	  1980s.	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Ironically,	  through	  this	  analysis,	  it	  becomes	  clear	  that	  similar	  factors	  played	  into	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  Chilean	  economy	  under	  Allende	  in	  1972-­‐1973	  and	  under	  Pinochet	  in	  1975.	  In	  both	  cases,	  the	  lack	  of	  American	  investment	  led	  to	  a	  collapse	  of	  consumer	  confidence	  and	  market	  success	  throughout	  Chile.	  Furthermore,	  economic	  sabotage	  played	  a	  vital	  role	  in	  the	  downfall	  of	  both	  economies.	  For	  Allende,	  the	  saboteurs	  were	  American	  businesses	  and	  the	  CIA.	  For	  Pinochet,	  ironically,	  the	  sabotage	  came	  from	  within	  his	  own	  cabinet,	  by	  way	  of	  the	  flawed	  neoliberal	  policies	  of	  Milton	  Friedman	  and	  the	  Chicago	  Boys.	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Chapter	  3:	  The	  Reagan	  Years:	  A	  Changing	  Policy	  Toward	  Chile	  
	  	   	  	   In	  this	  chapter,	  I	  will	  investigate	  the	  economic	  policies	  established	  by	  the	  U.S.	  government	  in	  regards	  to	  dealing	  with	  the	  Pinochet	  regime	  in	  Chile	  during	  the	  Reagan	  Administration.	  From	  1980	  through	  1988,	  the	  relationship	  between	  Santiago	  and	  Washington	  was	  volatile	  and	  had	  severe	  repercussions	  economically,	  as	  well	  as	  politically.	  From	  this	  perspective,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  an	  investigation	  of	  U.S.	  policies	  during	  the	  Reagan	  era	  is	  necessary	  to	  understand	  the	  twists	  and	  turns	  of	  U.S.-­‐Chilean	  economic	  policy	  during	  the	  1980s.	  	  	   Although	  the	  Reagan	  Administration	  made	  substantial	  attempts	  to	  shrink	  the	  U.S.	  government’s	  involvement	  in	  the	  Chilean	  political	  structure,	  U.S.	  policymakers	  had	  political	  and	  economic	  concerns	  that	  made	  severing	  such	  ties	  more	  difficult	  than	  they	  had	  thought.	  First	  and	  foremost,	  the	  Reagan	  Administration	  made	  it	  a	  primary	  goal	  to	  act	  aggressively	  against	  Soviet	  expansion	  and	  action.	  This	  was	  made	  clear	  when	  President	  Reagan	  called	  the	  USSR	  an	  “evil	  empire”	  in	  one	  of	  his	  first	  public	  addresses132.	  	  Following	  President	  Reagan’s	  lead,	  U.S.	  policymakers	  crafted	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policy	  that	  addressed	  the	  importance	  of	  maintaining	  a	  strong	  military,	  political,	  and	  economic	  ally	  in	  Latin	  America	  to	  fend	  off	  any	  potential	  Communist	  advances.	  	  	   The	  highly	  complex	  relationship	  between	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Chilean	  government	  created	  a	  situation	  in	  which	  we	  can	  establish	  two	  separate,	  yet	  equally	  important,	  phases	  in	  U.S.-­‐Chilean	  policy	  under	  the	  Reagan	  Administration.	  First,	  between	  1980	  and	  1983,	  President	  Reagan	  and	  many	  American	  policymakers	  were	  largely	  supportive	  of	  the	  U.S.-­‐Chilean	  alliance.	  Seen	  as	  a	  method	  to	  prevent	  a	  domino	  from	  tipping	  in	  Latin	  America,	  the	  economic	  and	  political	  support	  given	  to	  Pinochet	  garnered	  substantial	  support	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  environment.	  In	  this	  period,	  Reagan’s	  support	  for	  democracy	  and	  human	  rights	  in	  Chile	  was	  heavily	  outweighed	  by	  the	  regional	  security	  offered	  by	  a	  strong	  ally	  within	  the	  Southern	  Cone.	  	   The	  second	  period,	  however,	  marked	  a	  significant	  change	  in	  that	  relationship.	  It	  was	  not	  until	  a	  severe	  economic	  downturn	  in	  the	  early	  1980s,	  in	  concert	  with	  a	  growing	  concern	  over	  human	  rights	  violations,	  that	  the	  Reagan	  Administration	  began	  looking	  for	  ways	  to	  “promote	  a	  regime	  change	  and	  a	  return	  to	  democracy	  in	  Chile.”133.	  It	  is	  within	  this	  second	  period	  that	  President	  Reagan	  increased	  his	  efforts	  to	  promote	  a	  democratic	  transition	  within	  Chile.	  	   The	  policies	  enacted	  during	  the	  early	  1980s	  by	  the	  Reagan	  Administration	  in	  regard	  to	  U.S.-­‐Chilean	  relations	  marked	  a	  substantial	  departure	  from	  the	  policies	  of	  the	  Carter	  Administration	  in	  the	  late	  1970s.	  Carter’s	  crusade	  against	  human	  rights	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violations	  in	  Chile	  (and	  elsewhere)	  was	  successful	  in	  passing	  various	  sanctions	  against	  the	  Chilean	  government	  that	  included	  exclusion	  from	  loans	  provided	  by	  the	  Export-­‐Import	  Bank134.	  	  Within	  a	  month	  of	  taking	  office,	  President	  Reagan	  lifted	  these	  sanctions,	  citing	  an	  interest	  in	  normalizing	  relations	  with	  Chile	  as	  a	  result	  of	  perceived	  decrease	  in	  human	  rights	  abuses	  under	  Pinochet.	  This	  supposed	  improvement	  came	  as	  a	  result	  of	  an	  annual	  report	  on	  human	  rights	  compiled	  by	  the	  State	  Department	  in	  1981	  that	  argued	  “the	  human	  rights	  situation	  in	  Chile	  has	  improved	  significantly	  since	  1977.”135	  	   Despite	  the	  perceived	  advances	  made	  by	  the	  Pinochet	  regime	  during	  the	  early	  1980s	  to	  lessen	  the	  amount	  of	  human	  rights	  violations,	  many	  reports	  were	  filed	  that	  countered	  the	  aforementioned	  claims	  of	  the	  State	  Department,	  including	  the	  1981	  U.N.	  Human	  Rights	  Commission	  Report	  on	  Chile136.	  	  Notwithstanding	  the	  outcry	  made	  by	  human	  rights	  activists,	  the	  Reagan	  Administration	  moved	  forward	  in	  lifting	  sanctions	  from	  the	  Pinochet	  government.	  However,	  the	  lifting	  of	  the	  aforementioned	  sanctions	  only	  bought	  the	  Chilean	  government	  a	  small	  amount	  of	  breathing	  room.	  In	  1980,	  the	  United	  States	  economy	  dipped	  into	  a	  recession,	  pulling	  down	  demand	  for	  products	  manufactured	  throughout	  Latin	  America137.	  	  The	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combination	  of	  low	  demand	  and	  the	  rise	  in	  debt	  service	  payments	  for	  many	  Latin	  American	  nations	  created	  what	  became	  known	  as	  “The	  Lost	  Decade.”138	  	  	   Regionally,	  all	  of	  Latin	  America	  suffered	  throughout	  the	  early	  1980s.	  In	  1982,	  Latin	  America’s	  overall	  economic	  growth	  rate	  was	  negative	  one	  percent	  (and,	  per	  capita,	  negative	  three	  percent)139.	  Furthermore,	  stagnant	  economic	  growth	  coupled	  with	  record	  levels	  of	  inflation	  (averaged	  80	  percent)	  to	  deepen	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  economic	  downturn140.	  Chile	  was	  far	  from	  immune	  from	  the	  impacts	  of	  the	  regional	  financial	  crisis.	  In	  1981,	  Chilean	  banks	  began	  to	  default	  on	  loans	  and	  file	  bankruptcy.	  In	  1982	  alone,	  there	  were	  810	  bankruptcies141.	  It	  soon	  became	  clear	  to	  both	  Chilean	  policymakers	  and	  foreign	  observers	  that	  Chile	  was	  in	  a	  deep	  depression.	  During	  this	  time,	  there	  was	  a	  decrease	  of	  almost	  15%	  of	  the	  Chilean	  gross	  national	  product,	  a	  drop	  of	  20%	  in	  industrial	  production,	  and	  a	  dangerously	  high	  unemployment	  rate	  of	  30%	  of	  the	  total	  work	  force142.	  	   The	  sharp	  economic	  downturn	  in	  Chile	  led	  to	  two	  separate	  responses	  that	  are	  equally	  as	  important	  in	  the	  examination	  of	  U.S.-­‐Chilean	  relations	  during	  the	  1980s.	  First,	  a	  domestic	  response	  was	  necessary	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  the	  political	  and	  social	  unrest	  that	  Pinochet	  feared	  most.	  By	  1983,	  mass	  protests	  by	  the	  Chilean	  public	  in	  Santiago	  had	  gained	  international	  attention143.	  In	  addition,	  significant	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opposition	  to	  the	  Chilean	  government	  was	  clearly	  established	  in	  March	  of	  1983	  when	  a	  Democratic	  Manifesto	  was	  signed	  by	  “a	  coalition	  of	  (banned	  or	  suspended)	  political	  parties	  that	  ranged	  from	  moderate	  socialist	  to	  ex-­‐conservatives”	  in	  order	  to	  provide	  an	  alternative	  to	  the	  Pinochet	  regime144.	  	  In	  1982,	  Pinochet	  removed	  finance	  minister	  Sergio	  de	  Castro	  and	  shifted	  his	  reliance	  on	  economic	  expertise	  to	  his	  close	  advisors,	  some	  of	  which	  were	  economists	  known	  as	  Chicago	  Boys145.	  The	  following	  three	  years	  were	  dreadful	  for	  Chile’s	  economy,	  and	  it	  was	  not	  until	  1985	  that	  the	  Chilean	  government	  would	  make	  begin	  to	  make	  a	  recovery.	  	  	   In	  addition	  to	  the	  domestic	  response	  to	  the	  economic	  crisis,	  the	  United	  States	  government	  almost	  immediately	  took	  steps	  to	  remedy	  the	  situation	  while,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  advancing	  national	  interests	  of	  political	  and	  economic	  stability.	  During	  the	  early	  1980s,	  the	  Reagan	  Administration	  took	  full	  advantage	  of	  Chile’s	  economic	  downturn	  to	  advance	  its	  own	  political	  and	  economic	  objectives.	  At	  this	  time,	  the	  U.S.	  government	  began	  making	  both	  economic	  and	  political	  policy	  to	  attempt	  to	  deal	  with	  Pinochet’s	  Chile	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  would	  both	  ensure	  stability	  and	  gradually	  encourage	  a	  regime	  change146.	  	  	   As	  domestic	  protests	  and	  general	  opposition	  increased	  substantially	  against	  Pinochet	  and	  the	  Chilean	  government,	  U.S.	  policymakers	  looked	  toward	  the	  Reagan	  Administration	  and	  State	  Department	  to	  take	  action.	  In	  response,	  the	  Reagan	  Administration	  began	  exerting	  diplomatic	  and	  economic	  power	  to	  both	  stabilize	  the	  Chilean	  economy	  and	  coerce	  Pinochet	  to	  reconsider	  Chilean	  domestic	  policy	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(political	  and	  economic).	  One	  of	  the	  central	  tenets	  of	  Reagan	  economic	  policy	  directed	  toward	  Chile	  was	  a	  reliance	  on	  the	  private	  sector147.	  In	  a	  statement	  given	  in	  1981,	  Reagan	  summarized	  his	  overall	  economic	  policy	  and	  philosophy	  to	  senior	  ranking	  members	  of	  both	  the	  IMF	  and	  World	  Bank:	  “The	  societies	  which	  achieved	  the	  most	  spectacular,	  broad-­‐based	  economic	  progress	  in	  the	  shortest	  period	  of	  time	  are	  [those	  that]	  believe	  in	  the	  magic	  of	  the	  marketplace.”148	  	   President	  Reagan’s	  focus	  on	  the	  economic	  “magic”	  found	  in	  the	  free	  market	  proved	  to	  be	  a	  major	  force	  that	  drove	  U.S.	  foreign	  economic	  policy	  toward	  Chile	  in	  the	  1980s.	  Under	  Reagan,	  the	  Overseas	  Private	  Investment	  Corporation	  (OPIC)	  was	  expanded	  substantially	  and	  the	  Bureau	  for	  Private	  Enterprise	  was	  created	  within	  the	  Agency	  for	  International	  Development	  to	  further	  U.S.	  private	  sector	  involvement	  in	  foreign	  investment149.	  By	  increasing	  the	  ability	  for	  the	  private	  sector	  to	  become	  involved	  in	  foreign	  direct	  investment	  opportunities,	  Reagan	  was	  able	  to	  reduce	  the	  U.S.	  federal	  budget	  in	  areas	  such	  as	  multilateral	  financing:	  in	  1982,	  the	  U.S.	  Treasury	  Undersecretary	  announced	  “that	  U.S.	  support	  for	  soft	  loans	  through	  the	  IDB	  and	  the	  World	  Bank	  would	  be	  cut	  by	  26%.”150	  	  	   The	  entrance	  of	  new	  policies	  by	  the	  Reagan	  Administration	  shocked	  the	  economic	  balance	  of	  the	  entire	  world.	  While	  President	  Reagan	  attempted	  to	  cover	  decreases	  in	  international	  aid	  given	  directly	  by	  the	  U.S.	  government,	  he	  also	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supported	  votes	  in	  various	  international	  financial	  institutions	  (such	  as	  the	  IMF)	  that	  made	  lending	  practices	  much	  more	  difficult	  for	  nations	  such	  as	  Chile151.	  Many	  economists	  labeled	  these	  measures	  by	  the	  Reagan	  Administration	  to	  decrease	  debt	  forgiveness	  and	  increase	  the	  barriers	  to	  international	  assistance	  as	  drivers	  of	  the	  early	  1980	  financial	  crisis	  in	  Latin	  America152.	  	  	   It	  is	  imperative	  to	  understand	  that	  these	  policies	  were	  enacted	  pursuant	  to	  Reagan’s	  neoliberal	  outlook,	  rather	  than	  any	  intention	  of	  punishing	  Chile	  or	  other	  recipients	  of	  U.S.	  foreign	  aid.	  Ronald	  Reagan	  came	  to	  be	  known	  as	  a	  President	  who	  had	  a	  strong	  command	  over	  his	  advisors	  and	  aides	  and,	  as	  a	  result,	  was	  able	  to	  set	  the	  Administration’s	  policies	  and	  priorities	  to	  match	  up	  with	  his	  strong	  convictions153.	  The	  implementation	  of	  neoliberal	  economic	  policies	  was	  one	  of	  the	  central	  tenets	  of	  Reagan’s	  philosophy	  as	  President,	  and	  this	  was	  clearly	  reflected	  in	  the	  Administration’s	  economic	  policies	  toward	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world,	  Chile	  included.	  	  	   The	  combination	  of	  Chile’s	  economic	  instability	  and	  the	  United	  States’	  high	  level	  of	  power	  and	  influence	  within	  international	  financial	  institutions	  helped	  the	  Reagan	  Administration	  hold	  leverage	  over	  Pinochet.	  It	  is	  essential	  to	  recognize	  that	  the	  Reagan	  Administration	  was	  both	  unable	  and	  unwilling	  to	  successfully	  reverse	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President	  Carter’s	  strong	  anti-­‐Pinochet	  policy	  without	  “a	  degree	  of	  reciprocity	  on	  Pinochet’s	  part”	  in	  terms	  of	  dealing	  with	  domestic	  human	  rights	  abuses154.	  	   As	  previously	  mentioned,	  the	  policies	  enacted	  during	  first	  few	  years	  of	  the	  Reagan	  Administration	  toward	  Chile	  made	  it	  clear	  that	  the	  American	  government	  valued	  regional	  security	  higher	  than	  issues	  such	  as	  human	  rights	  violations.	  Starting	  in	  late	  1982,	  however,	  a	  shift	  in	  policy	  toward	  Chile	  began	  as	  a	  result	  of	  a	  variety	  of	  factors.	  	  First,	  by	  1982,	  President	  Reagan	  had	  developed	  a	  reputation	  as	  a	  warmonger	  following	  his	  aggressive	  diplomatic	  efforts	  in	  regards	  to	  increase	  nuclear	  capabilities	  for	  the	  NATO	  alliance	  in	  Europe.	  Shortly	  thereafter	  he	  realized	  that	  this	  was	  a	  reputation	  that	  he	  could	  not	  successfully	  operate	  as	  President	  with155.	  As	  a	  result,	  he	  began	  efforts	  to	  explicitly	  promote	  democratic	  regimes	  and	  movements	  throughout	  the	  world.	  	  This	  shift	  by	  Reagan	  was	  a	  key	  moment	  in	  the	  development	  of	  U.S.	  foreign	  policy.	  Following	  one	  of	  Reagan’s	  most	  notable	  speeches	  (given	  in	  front	  of	  the	  British	  Parliament	  in	  1982)	  supporting	  a	  “democratic	  revolution,”	  the	  U.S.	  Congress	  began	  solidifying	  plans	  to	  create	  a	  governmental	  agency	  to	  fund	  democratic	  movements	  throughout	  the	  world156.	  By	  1983	  this	  dream	  had	  become	  a	  reality	  through	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  National	  Endowment	  for	  Democracy,	  which	  directly	  funded	  efforts	  to	  promote	  democracy	  around	  the	  world157.	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The	  second	  factor	  that	  led	  to	  a	  shift	  in	  U.S.	  economic	  policy	  toward	  Chile	  was	  the	  growth	  of	  a	  unified	  centrist	  political	  opposition	  to	  Pinochet	  within	  Chile.	  As	  previously	  mentioned,	  a	  major	  concern	  for	  the	  Reagan	  Administration	  was	  that	  if	  Pinochet	  were	  to	  lose	  power,	  the	  popularity	  of	  the	  Chilean	  leftist	  political	  opposition	  would	  grow	  substantially	  and	  the	  government	  would	  fall	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  Communists.	  This	  concern	  dissipated	  in	  early	  1983	  when	  an	  opposition	  coalition	  dominated	  by	  political	  centrists	  organized	  mass	  protests	  and	  officially	  offered	  an	  alternative	  to	  the	  Pinochet	  government158.	  	  	  The	  third	  and	  final	  factor	  that	  helped	  solidify	  a	  shift	  in	  the	  Reagan	  Administration’s	  policy	  toward	  a	  more	  aggressive	  stance	  toward	  Pinochet	  was	  the	  deterioration	  of	  diplomatic	  exchanges	  between	  Pinochet	  and	  American	  government	  officials.	  The	  diplomatic	  exchange	  between	  Reagan	  and	  Pinochet	  between	  1983	  and	  1985	  was	  a	  particularly	  interesting	  moment	  in	  U.S.-­‐Chilean	  relations.	  By	  October	  of	  1984,	  the	  United	  States	  State	  Department	  had	  begun	  a	  “full	  scale	  review	  of	  its	  policy	  toward	  Chile”	  in	  regards	  to	  the	  rampant	  human	  rights	  abuses	  in	  the	  country159.	  Throughout	  this	  period,	  President	  Reagan	  seemed	  to	  act	  firm	  in	  regards	  to	  showing	  his	  dissatisfaction	  with	  Pinochet	  in	  regards	  to	  human	  rights.	  In	  various	  speeches	  and	  addresses,	  Reagan	  and	  officials	  within	  his	  Administration	  lashed	  out	  against	  Pinochet	  and	  his	  regime160.	  	  	   However	  firm	  Reagan	  may	  have	  seemed	  in	  this	  regard,	  it	  quickly	  became	  evident	  that	  he	  was	  incapable	  of	  putting	  his	  money	  where	  his	  mouth	  was	  when	  it	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came	  to	  acting	  against	  Pinochet.	  In	  almost	  every	  opportunity	  for	  the	  U.S.	  to	  veto	  loans	  given	  to	  Chile	  by	  various	  international	  institutions,	  Reagan	  instead	  approved	  the	  loans161.	  This	  stood	  in	  stark	  contrast	  to	  the	  votes	  by	  President	  Carter	  between	  1977	  and	  1980	  in	  which	  nine	  loans	  through	  the	  multilateral	  development	  banks	  were	  brought	  to	  vote	  and	  the	  U.S.	  voted	  against	  all	  nine162.	  	   Despite	  this	  potentially	  damning	  element	  of	  the	  Reagan	  economic	  policy	  toward	  Chile,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  recognize	  the	  limitations	  that	  were	  perceived	  by	  the	  Reagan	  Administration	  when	  it	  came	  to	  potential	  action	  that	  could	  be	  taken	  against	  Chile.	  Unlike	  President	  Carter,	  Ronald	  Reagan	  refused	  to	  sacrifice	  domestic	  economic	  growth	  and	  prosperity	  for	  international	  respect	  for	  human	  rights.	  As	  mentioned	  previously,	  the	  copper	  industry	  in	  Chile	  was	  a	  major	  component	  of	  U.S.-­‐Chilean	  economic	  policy	  throughout	  the	  20th	  century.	  Following	  Allende’s	  nationalization	  of	  the	  copper	  industry,	  the	  U.S.	  government	  and	  U.S.	  businesses	  and	  investors	  became	  increasingly	  sensitive	  to	  any	  potential	  disruptions	  in	  the	  production,	  sale,	  or	  general	  trade	  of	  copper	  from	  Chile.	  	  After	  a	  protectionist	  request	  by	  U.S.	  businesses	  to	  the	  U.S.	  government	  to	  impose	  trade	  restrictions	  on	  Chilean	  copper,	  the	  Reagan	  Administration	  recognized	  that	  the	  economic	  relationship	  was	  potentially	  too	  delicate	  to	  act	  aggressively	  in	  regards	  to	  international	  aid163.	  In	  addition,	  an	  announcement	  by	  Pinochet	  that	  Chile	  would	  “not	  be	  able	  to	  pay	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amortization	  of	  principal	  on	  its	  international	  debts”	  to	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  U.S.	  banks	  sparked	  a	  series	  of	  concerns	  throughout	  Washington164.	  	  	   As	  a	  result	  of	  the	  delicate	  economic	  relationship,	  Reagan	  had	  to	  tiptoe	  the	  line	  between	  being	  economically	  supportive	  and	  politically	  aggressive.	  To	  make	  matters	  worse,	  Pinochet	  made	  numerous	  public	  and	  private	  comments	  that	  put	  further	  strain	  on	  U.S.-­‐Chilean	  relations.	  In	  one	  particularly	  striking	  moment	  in	  U.S.-­‐Chilean	  relations,	  Pinochet	  was	  quoted	  in	  a	  Newsweek	  article	  as	  saying	  “We	  have	  always	  had	  problems	  with	  the	  United	  States.	  We	  don’t	  like	  anyone,	  even	  the	  powerful	  U.S.,	  telling	  us	  how	  to	  run	  our	  lives.	  We	  will	  never	  accept	  it.”165	  	   This	  volatile	  moment	  in	  U.S.-­‐Chilean	  relations	  was	  also	  characterized	  by	  a	  clear	  interest	  by	  the	  Reagan	  Administration	  to	  attempt	  to	  introduce	  a	  more	  centrist	  government	  transition	  in	  Chile.	  Following	  a	  breakdown	  in	  communication	  between	  the	  White	  House	  and	  Pinochet	  (as	  shown	  in	  the	  aforementioned	  quote),	  members	  of	  the	  U.S.	  Embassy	  in	  Santiago	  began	  to	  meet	  with	  various	  leaders	  of	  the	  Democratic	  Alliance,	  the	  coalition	  opposition	  party	  in	  Chile166.	  	  	   At	  this	  point	  in	  time,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  there	  was	  a	  growing	  consensus	  within	  the	  Reagan	  Administration	  that	  Pinochet	  had	  to	  go.	  As	  previously	  argued,	  the	  Reagan	  Administration	  felt	  as	  though	  one	  of	  the	  most	  effective	  ways	  to	  help	  support	  a	  democratic	  transition	  was	  a	  combination	  of	  economic	  pressure	  directed	  toward	  Pinochet	  and	  support	  for	  Chilean	  political	  opposition	  to	  him167.	  By	  1983,	  when	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political	  opposition	  to	  Pinochet	  began	  to	  solidify,	  members	  of	  the	  Reagan	  Administration	  looked	  to	  members	  of	  the	  Christian	  Democrats	  to	  make	  contact	  and	  support168.	  	   This	  particular	  relationship	  between	  the	  U.S.	  government	  and	  the	  Christian	  Democrats	  became	  exponentially	  more	  complex	  when	  Jaime	  Castillo,	  the	  vice-­‐president	  of	  the	  Christian	  Democrats,	  publicly	  announced	  his	  support	  of	  Communists	  in	  Chile:	  “We	  Christian	  Democrats	  defend	  the	  right	  of	  any	  communist	  to	  be	  a	  person	  and	  recognize	  the	  fact	  that	  this	  is	  a	  group	  which	  has	  influence	  in	  the	  country…We	  want	  them	  to	  work	  for	  the	  return	  of	  democracy	  in	  Chile.”169	  Although	  merely	  recognizing	  the	  Communists	  as	  persons	  capable	  of	  political	  engagement	  may	  seem	  radical,	  for	  policymakers	  in	  the	  Reagan	  Administration,	  the	  slightest	  hint	  of	  a	  Communist	  resurgence	  in	  Chile	  or	  Latin	  America	  was	  a	  cause	  for	  great	  concern.	  	  	   Identifying	  the	  fear	  of	  a	  Communist	  resurgence	  in	  Chile	  by	  Reagan	  is	  a	  crucial	  element	  of	  this	  investigation	  into	  U.S.	  economic	  policy	  toward	  Chile	  during	  the	  1980s.	  As	  previously	  mentioned,	  Reagan’s	  concern	  for	  economic	  security	  following	  the	  global	  recession	  in	  the	  early	  1980s	  was	  one	  of	  the	  factors	  that	  led	  to	  a	  reexamination	  of	  U.S.	  policy	  toward	  Chile.	  The	  other	  factor	  was	  Reagan’s	  adoption	  of	  a	  fight-­‐for-­‐democracy	  type	  of	  attitude	  when	  crafting	  foreign	  policy.	  These	  two	  factors	  were	  extremely	  important	  in	  highlighting	  the	  problems	  that	  existed	  within	  American	  foreign	  policy	  toward	  Chile.	  	  	   However,	  it	  was	  Reagan’s	  genuine	  fear	  of	  a	  Communist	  resurgence	  or	  revolution	  in	  Chile	  that	  pushed	  the	  President	  from	  a	  sympathizer	  to	  a	  outspoken	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opponent	  of	  the	  Pinochet	  regime.	  The	  fear	  of	  a	  growth	  of	  the	  political	  left	  was	  a	  central	  concern	  for	  the	  Reagan	  Administration	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  1980s	  when	  it	  began	  drafting	  contingency	  plans	  and	  potential	  policies	  to	  ensure	  a	  moderated	  democratic	  transition170	  These	  U.S.	  economic	  policies	  attempted	  to	  put	  enough	  pressure	  on	  Pinochet	  to	  fold	  while,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  encourage	  the	  moderate	  opposition	  to	  increase	  activity	  and	  visibility.	  	  The	  eventual	  solidification	  of	  a	  unified	  and	  moderated	  opposition	  (without	  significant	  Communist	  influence)	  was	  the	  major	  turning	  point	  that	  convinced	  Reagan	  to	  move	  forward	  with	  plans	  to	  promote	  a	  democratic	  transition	  in	  Chile:	  “these	  conditions	  convinced	  the	  Reagan	  administration	  to	  adopt	  a	  policy	  of	  gradual	  intervention	  into	  the	  process	  of	  democratization	  without	  forcing	  a	  breakdown	  of	  the	  regime.”171	  	   Within	  this	  Cold	  War	  framework,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  position	  of	  the	  U.S.	  government	  in	  regard	  to	  its	  relationship	  with	  Pinochet	  was	  complex	  and,	  as	  a	  result,	  the	  solutions	  to	  the	  problem	  would	  be	  just	  as	  complex.	  Even	  though	  at	  this	  point	  Reagan	  was	  pushing	  for	  a	  gradual	  democratic	  transition,	  he	  had	  a	  difficult	  time	  fully	  giving	  up	  on	  a	  potentially	  cooperative	  relationship	  with	  Pinochet172.	  In	  order	  to	  avoid	  making	  any	  potentially	  disastrous	  policy	  decisions	  directly	  toward	  Pinochet	  and	  Chile,	  Reagan	  turned	  to	  the	  international	  arena	  for	  a	  solution.	  	  	   Among	  the	  various	  policies	  to	  promote	  a	  peaceful	  and	  democratic	  transition	  in	  Chile	  crafted	  by	  the	  Reagan	  Administration,	  one	  of	  the	  most	  overlooked	  is	  the	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engagement	  of	  other	  nations.	  In	  particular,	  a	  number	  of	  governments	  in	  Western	  Europe	  had	  significant	  trade	  relationships	  with	  Chile	  and,	  as	  a	  result,	  were	  also	  concerned	  that	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  Chilean	  government	  would	  send	  shockwaves	  through	  the	  global	  economy173.	  	  One	  example	  of	  this	  occurred	  in	  February	  1984,	  when	  Chancellor	  Helmut	  Kohl	  of	  Germany	  sent	  President	  Reagan	  a	  classified	  memorandum	  in	  regards	  to	  the	  deteriorating	  situation	  in	  Chile174.	  In	  this	  document,	  Chancellor	  Kohl	  not	  only	  expressed	  his	  political	  and	  economic	  concerns	  about	  Chile	  and	  Pinochet,	  but	  also	  suggested	  that	  American	  and	  German	  diplomats	  consult	  “to	  explore	  and	  discuss	  in	  more	  detail	  our	  common	  concerns	  and	  interests	  about	  Chile.”175	  	   Through	  conversations	  like	  the	  aforementioned	  cables	  with	  Chancellor	  Kohl,	  in	  concert	  with	  the	  economic	  downturn,	  the	  rise	  in	  human	  rights	  violations,	  and	  the	  recognition	  of	  a	  politically	  moderate	  and	  unified	  Chilean	  opposition	  to	  Pinochet,	  President	  Reagan	  recognized	  that	  the	  American	  government	  had	  to	  take	  action	  against	  Pinochet.	  In	  1985,	  the	  American	  government	  did	  just	  that.	  During	  a	  vote	  over	  a	  loan	  by	  the	  Interamerican	  Development	  Bank	  to	  Chile	  for	  $430	  million,	  the	  United	  States	  abstained	  from	  the	  vote176.	  The	  political	  uproar	  that	  followed	  both	  within	  the	  U.S.	  Congress	  (led	  by	  Senator	  Jesse	  Helms)	  and	  in	  the	  international	  arena	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is	  reflective	  of	  the	  high	  level	  of	  power	  a	  simple	  vote	  abstention	  held	  during	  this	  volatile	  time177.	  	  	   A	  short	  six	  months	  after	  this	  vote,	  Pinochet	  yielded	  to	  U.S.	  economic	  pressures	  and	  lifted	  the	  state	  of	  siege	  in	  Chile	  that	  had	  given	  the	  Chilean	  government	  legal	  power	  to	  commit	  a	  litany	  of	  human	  rights	  violations178.	  Over	  the	  next	  few	  years	  of	  Pinochet	  rule,	  the	  U.S.	  had	  a	  mixed	  record	  of	  approving	  loans	  to	  Chile;	  however,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  Reagan	  Administration	  definitely	  had	  not	  fallen	  back	  into	  total	  support	  for	  Pinochet	  and	  his	  regime.	  From	  1985	  through	  1988,	  Reagan	  worked	  with	  close	  advisors	  to	  create	  contingency	  plans	  for	  how	  to	  deal	  with	  Chile.	  	  When	  reports	  continued	  to	  point	  to	  human	  rights	  violations	  in	  Chile	  even	  after	  the	  lifting	  of	  the	  state	  of	  siege,	  President	  Reagan	  moved	  forward	  with	  the	  CIA	  and	  other	  intelligence	  organizations	  to	  lay	  out	  contingency	  plans.	  	  These	  plans	  focused	  on	  a	  few	  key	  areas	  and	  trends.	  First,	  Reagan’s	  advisors	  saw	  that	  there	  was	  tremendous	  opportunity	  within	  the	  ranks	  of	  the	  Chilean	  military	  itself.	  According	  to	  a	  declassified	  report	  that	  outlined	  U.S.-­‐Chilean	  policy,	  the	  domestic	  political	  chaos	  within	  Chile	  had	  begun	  to	  create	  uncertainty	  and	  a	  lack	  of	  confidence	  within	  Pinochet	  by	  late	  1986179.	  Although	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  both	  the	  Chilean	  Junta	  as	  well	  as	  the	  American	  government	  feared	  the	  resurgence	  of	  a	  Communist	  Chilean	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opposition,	  “three	  of	  the	  four	  junta	  members…[defied]	  Pinochet	  by	  dealing	  openly	  with	  moderate	  opposition	  leaders.”180	  By	  early	  1986,	  the	  fear	  of	  a	  Communist	  uprising	  by	  a	  Chilean	  Communist	  opposition	  group	  had	  largely	  disappeared.	  However,	  despite	  the	  solidification	  of	  a	  unified	  opposition	  to	  Pinochet,	  there	  were	  still	  various	  Communist	  organizations	  that	  acted	  against	  the	  Pinochet	  regime.	  	  At	  this	  point	  in	  time,	  the	  major	  concern	  for	  Reagan	  and	  his	  advisors	  was	  that	  these	  groups	  could	  potentially	  derail	  the	  gradual	  democratic	  transition	  by	  sparking	  a	  revolution181.	  This	  concern	  was	  validated	  in	  1986.	  	  	  On	  September	  7th,	  the	  Chilean	  Communist	  paramilitary	  group,	  the	  Manual	  Rodriguez	  Patriotic	  Front,	  or	  FPMR,	  attempted	  to	  assassinate	  Pinochet182.	  In	  this	  failed	  attempt,	  members	  of	  the	  FPMR	  ambushed	  Pinochet’s	  motorcade	  and	  fired	  a	  combination	  of	  machine	  gun	  rounds	  and	  rockets	  toward	  Pinochet’s	  bulletproofed	  Mercedes-­‐Benz183.	  	  	   Just	  weeks	  prior	  to	  the	  assassination	  attempt,	  “huge	  arms	  caches”	  on	  the	  way	  from	  Cuba	  to	  the	  FPMR	  were	  discovered	  by	  the	  Chilean	  government184.	  Many	  of	  the	  same	  variety	  of	  weapons	  used	  in	  the	  assassination	  attempt	  were	  found	  in	  this	  seized	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cargo	  and	  the	  connection	  between	  the	  shipment	  from	  Cuba	  and	  the	  assassination	  “shocked	  the	  armed	  forces	  into	  recognizing	  that	  the	  violence-­‐prone	  far	  left	  is	  a	  real	  threat	  to	  the	  regime.”185	  As	  a	  result,	  Pinochet	  instituted	  a	  temporary	  90	  day	  state	  of	  siege,	  which	  created	  further	  concerns	  for	  the	  Reagan	  Administration186.	  	  	   Following	  the	  reinstatement	  of	  the	  state	  of	  siege	  by	  Pinochet	  and	  the	  Chilean	  Junta,	  Reagan	  requested	  that	  his	  advisors	  provide	  him	  with	  a	  comprehensive	  strategy	  in	  dealing	  with	  Chile.	  As	  previously	  mentioned,	  Reagan	  was	  looking	  for	  the	  most	  effective	  way	  to	  promote	  a	  peaceful	  transition	  to	  democracy	  without	  abandoning	  U.S.	  interests	  along	  the	  way.	  In	  1987,	  this	  report	  was	  given	  to	  Reagan	  and	  outlined	  four	  potential	  outcomes	  of	  Chilean	  problems187.	  	  	   First,	  the	  advisors	  considered	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  negotiated	  transition	  to	  democracy	  occurring.	  As	  explained	  previously,	  with	  the	  solidification	  of	  organized	  domestic	  political	  opposition,	  defiance	  within	  the	  Junta	  itself,	  and	  the	  potential	  of	  having	  U.S.	  congressional	  sanctions	  placed	  against	  Chile,	  by	  the	  early	  to	  middle	  1980s	  members	  of	  the	  Reagan	  Administration	  believed	  that	  a	  peaceful	  transition	  was	  possible188.	  That	  being	  said,	  these	  same	  advisors	  believed	  that	  a	  level	  of	  economic	  pressure	  was	  integral	  to	  the	  U.S.	  effort	  at	  promoting	  such	  a	  transition.	  	   Knowing	  that	  these	  economic	  pressures	  might	  not	  be	  successful	  in	  forcing	  Pinochet	  to	  make	  an	  agreement	  with	  the	  Chilean	  opposition,	  the	  report	  also	  entertained	  the	  possibility	  of	  the	  military	  forcing	  Pinochet	  out	  of	  power.	  Based	  on	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the	  levels	  of	  economic	  pressure	  placed	  on	  Chile	  as	  well	  as	  the	  growing	  opposition,	  the	  advisors	  to	  President	  Reagan	  believed	  that	  the	  Chilean	  military	  leadership	  “would	  demand	  that	  he	  agree	  to	  publicly	  step	  down	  at	  the	  end	  of	  his	  term”	  by	  the	  middle	  of	  1988189.	  	  	   The	  third	  outcome	  was	  that	  Pinochet	  would	  be	  killed	  in	  some	  sort	  of	  leftist	  assassination	  plot.	  Considering	  the	  level	  to	  which	  the	  FPMR	  was	  able	  to	  acquire	  heavy	  weaponry	  through	  Cuba,	  advisors	  to	  Reagan	  saw	  this	  as	  a	  fairly	  reasonable	  outcome.	  However,	  the	  idea	  of	  Pinochet	  leaving	  office	  by	  means	  of	  violence	  would	  only	  lead	  to	  further	  violence	  by	  the	  government,	  and	  this	  would	  create	  more	  issues	  for	  a	  potential	  democratic	  transition190.	  	   The	  final	  outcome	  that	  was	  strongly	  considered	  was	  the	  notion	  that	  Pinochet	  was	  able	  to	  retain	  his	  control	  over	  the	  Chilean	  government.	  The	  analysts	  made	  a	  key	  observation	  in	  relation	  to	  this	  potential	  outcome.	  This	  observation	  was	  that	  in	  1989	  the	  Constitution	  mandated	  a	  plebiscite	  and	  that	  if	  Pinochet	  were	  able	  to	  maintain	  control	  of	  the	  government,	  he	  would	  manipulate	  it	  “through	  control	  of	  the	  media,	  restrictive	  electoral	  registration	  laws,	  or…	  outright	  fraud.”191	  According	  to	  these	  analysts,	  unless	  something	  substantial	  happened	  in	  Chile	  between	  the	  1987	  and	  the	  1989	  plebiscite,	  Pinochet	  would	  be	  able	  to	  use	  his	  political	  power	  to	  manipulate	  the	  election	  to	  his	  advantage,	  solidifying	  his	  control	  (yet	  again)	  over	  the	  government192.	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   Reagan	  took	  this	  report	  and	  the	  advice	  of	  his	  advisors	  seriously.	  Beginning	  in	  1987,	  President	  Reagan	  began	  implementing	  some	  of	  the	  strictest	  economic	  measures	  against	  Chile	  since	  Allende193.	  It	  is	  clear	  that	  out	  of	  all	  of	  the	  options	  laid	  out	  by	  his	  advisors,	  the	  Reagan	  Administration	  wished	  to	  help	  create	  an	  economic	  climate	  in	  which	  Pinochet’s	  organized	  opposition	  would	  gain	  significant	  clout	  and	  he	  would	  be	  forced	  to	  begin	  the	  process	  of	  a	  political	  transition.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  tight	  economic	  measures	  were	  seen	  as	  an	  effective	  way	  to	  cut	  Pinochet’s	  domestic	  support	  and	  put	  international	  pressure	  on	  him	  simultaneously.	  	  	   Specifically,	  President	  Reagan	  instructed	  representatives	  at	  the	  World	  Bank	  and	  United	  Nations	  to	  abstain	  on	  votes	  that	  dealt	  with	  Chile.	  In	  total,	  the	  United	  States	  abstained	  on	  one	  vote	  on	  human	  rights	  in	  Chile	  in	  the	  United	  Nations	  and	  abstained	  on	  three	  votes	  to	  give	  loans	  to	  Chile	  in	  the	  World	  Bank194.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  President	  Reagan	  and	  his	  Secretary	  of	  State,	  George	  Schultz,	  made	  a	  joint	  statement	  “which	  outlined	  the	  administration’s	  view	  of	  what	  would	  constitute	  a	  free	  election	  in	  Chile.”195	  In	  one	  of	  the	  most	  surprising	  actions	  by	  Reagan	  in	  regards	  to	  U.S.-­‐Chilean	  economic	  relations,	  however,	  was	  in	  later	  in	  1987	  when	  he	  revoked	  Chile’s	  ability	  to	  be	  insured	  by	  the	  Overseas	  Private	  Investment	  Corporation196.	  This	  specific	  move	  by	  Reagan	  was	  particularly	  impactful	  on	  the	  Chilean	  government	  as	  U.S.-­‐Chilean	  economic	  relations	  had	  a	  heavy	  history	  on	  balancing	  both	  public	  and	  private	  investment.	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   The	  private	  sector	  also	  became	  involved	  in	  the	  battle	  against	  Pinochet.	  In	  the	  middle	  of	  1987,	  a	  team	  of	  Chilean	  social	  scientists	  organized	  a	  broad-­‐based	  study	  “to	  analyze	  the	  changes	  in	  Chilean	  society	  and	  to	  prescribe	  the	  appropriate	  responses.”197	  This	  study	  was	  possible	  due	  to	  the	  involvement	  of	  American,	  Canadian,	  and	  European	  think	  tanks	  as	  well	  as	  the	  Ford	  Foundation	  who	  provided	  all	  of	  the	  investment	  needed	  to	  carry	  out	  the	  research198.	  This	  study	  revealed	  that	  the	  single	  largest	  factor	  holding	  back	  Chilean	  society	  was	  that	  an	  overwhelming	  majority	  of	  people	  felt	  that	  they	  were	  living	  in	  a	  “climate	  of	  fear.”199	  These	  results	  eventually	  helped	  create	  the	  framework	  for	  the	  “’no’	  vote	  movement”	  that	  was	  used	  during	  Pinochet’s	  special	  election	  in	  1988200.	  	  	   The	  aforementioned	  policies	  of	  economic	  pressure	  placed	  on	  Pinochet	  and	  the	  Chilean	  military	  government	  eventually	  became	  too	  much	  for	  the	  repressive	  general	  to	  handle.	  In	  1988,	  President	  Pinochet	  announced	  that	  he	  would	  hold	  a	  special	  plebiscite,	  which	  would	  ask	  the	  Chilean	  public	  to	  vote	  “yes”	  for	  Pinochet	  to	  stay	  in	  power	  or	  “no”	  to	  get	  him	  out	  of	  office201.	  This	  announcement	  shocked	  Chileans	  as	  well	  as	  foreign	  observers,	  including	  the	  Reagan	  Administration.	  	  	   As	  a	  result	  of	  this	  news,	  the	  Chilean	  political	  opposition	  to	  Pinochet	  frantically	  began	  consolidating	  itself	  and	  preparing	  for	  the	  plebiscite.	  Instead	  of	  relying	  on	  the	  leadership	  of	  a	  single	  party	  or	  worrying	  about	  who	  to	  include,	  a	  broad-­‐based	  coalition	  of	  political	  parties	  from	  the	  far	  left	  to	  far	  right	  was	  created	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called	  the	  “Concertacion.”202	  	  This	  political	  alliance	  worked	  tirelessly	  to	  promote	  the	  “’no’	  vote	  movement”	  and	  try	  to	  mobilize	  the	  Chilean	  public	  that	  had	  been	  without	  a	  truly	  free	  election	  since	  1970.	  	  The	  American	  private	  sector	  could	  not	  stay	  away	  from	  this	  battle	  either.	  Within	  a	  matter	  of	  weeks	  after	  organizing,	  the	  Concertacion	  had	  “mounted	  a	  highly	  effective	  television	  campaign”	  that	  was	  funded	  and	  aided	  by	  media	  consultants	  from	  the	  United	  States203.	  In	  addition,	  there	  were	  widespread	  reports	  that	  dozens	  of	  American	  political	  consultants	  were	  working	  with	  the	  Concertacion	  to	  organize	  an	  effective	  campaign	  strategy204.	  	  At	  11:30pm	  on	  October	  5th,	  1988,	  it	  was	  announced	  that	  the	  No	  Vote	  had	  won	  by	  a	  “decisive	  55	  to	  43	  percent.”205	  Despite	  many	  concerns	  that	  Pinochet	  would	  fight	  the	  results	  or	  simply	  not	  follow	  the	  people’s	  wishes,	  he	  accepted	  the	  results	  knowing	  that,	  through	  the	  Constitution,	  he	  was	  able	  to	  retain	  his	  position	  as	  commander-­‐in-­‐chief	  of	  the	  Chilean	  Armed	  Forces	  until	  1998206.	  Within	  the	  year,	  the	  Chilean	  public	  had	  elected	  a	  new	  President,	  and	  the	  so-­‐called	  “Chilean	  Crisis”	  was	  no	  longer	  a	  headache	  for	  the	  Reagan	  Administration.	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Conclusion	  
	  
	  
	  	  The	  history	  of	  U.S.	  economic	  policy	  toward	  Chile	  is	  a	  highly	  complex	  topic	  that	  is	  reflective	  of	  many	  issues	  in	  contemporary	  American	  political	  thought.	  	  The	  balance	  between	  maintaining	  political	  alliances,	  proliferating	  democratic	  values,	  and	  promoting	  free	  market	  and	  neoliberal	  economic	  principles	  is	  still	  a	  major	  concern	  today.	  	  During	  the	  Cold	  War,	  this	  balance	  was	  highly	  strained	  as	  factors	  such	  as	  international	  economic	  crises	  and	  the	  global	  spread	  of	  Communism	  struck	  fear	  in	  the	  hearts	  of	  American	  policymakers.	  	  	  From	  JFK	  to	  Ronald	  Reagan,	  American	  presidents	  during	  the	  Cold	  War	  were	  deeply	  concerned	  with	  economic	  and	  political	  stability	  on	  a	  global	  scale.	  In	  many	  cases,	  these	  concerns	  led	  to	  major	  policy	  initiatives	  to	  promote	  regional	  alliances	  to	  contain	  Communist	  aggression	  and	  expansion.	  	  	   In	  the	  case	  of	  Chile,	  American	  businesses	  and	  policymakers	  had	  been	  highly	  involved	  in	  the	  economy	  since	  the	  early	  1900’s	  when	  President	  Theodore	  Roosevelt	  invoked	  the	  Roosevelt	  Corollary	  to	  the	  Monroe	  Doctrine	  to	  expand	  U.S.-­‐Latin	  American	  relations207.	  During	  Roosevelt’s	  time	  in	  office,	  the	  United	  States	  used	  military	  force	  and	  the	  threat	  of	  military	  force	  to	  keep	  European	  nations	  out	  of	  the	  Western	  hemisphere	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  prevent	  any	  economic	  expansion.	  Shortly	  thereafter,	  the	  American	  government	  “rapidly	  expanded	  its	  influence	  in	  Latin	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America”	  by	  leveraging	  economic	  policy	  in	  order	  to	  achieve	  political	  goals208.	  Chile	  was	  one	  nation	  that	  was	  a	  major	  target	  of	  U.S.	  policy	  and	  American	  companies	  quickly	  began	  securing	  an	  economic	  foothold	  in	  the	  nation,	  primarily	  within	  the	  copper	  industry209.	  	  	   It	  is	  through	  this	  lens	  that	  we	  must	  view	  U.S.-­‐Chilean	  relations	  during	  the	  middle	  to	  late	  Cold	  War.	  Presidents	  in	  the	  1960s,	  70s,	  and	  80s	  created	  economic	  policies	  to	  ensure	  their	  regional,	  political,	  and	  economic	  objectives.	  Although	  these	  specific	  policies	  varied	  from	  president	  to	  president,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  everyone	  from	  John	  F.	  Kennedy	  to	  Ronald	  Reagan	  utilized	  the	  full	  power	  of	  the	  United	  States	  government	  to	  leverage	  economic	  power	  to	  achieve	  its	  objectives.	  	   This	  examination	  of	  U.S.	  economic	  policy	  directed	  toward	  Chile	  centers	  on	  the	  political	  and	  economic	  changes	  that	  occurred	  within	  Chile	  between	  1960	  and	  1988.	  Beginning	  in	  the	  early	  1960’s,	  the	  United	  States	  government	  began	  broad	  based	  economic	  reform	  programs	  to	  promote	  growth	  and	  stability	  within	  Latin	  America.	  As	  these	  programs	  lost	  momentum	  and	  popularity,	  right-­‐wing	  political	  parties	  in	  Chile	  began	  to	  lose	  ground	  to	  leftist	  political	  movements.	  The	  rise	  of	  Salvador	  Allende	  and	  his	  eventual	  election	  in	  1970	  forever	  changed	  the	  relationship	  between	  Washington	  and	  Santiago.	  Less	  than	  three	  years	  after	  his	  election,	  Dr.	  Allende	  died	  in	  a	  violent	  military	  coup,	  and	  Augusto	  Pinochet	  took	  power.	  For	  the	  next	  15	  years	  or	  so,	  Pinochet	  waged	  a	  war	  upon	  his	  own	  people	  while	  using	  the	  Chilean	  economy	  as	  an	  experiment	  for	  radical	  free	  market	  economic	  reform.	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   The	  events	  that	  occurred	  within	  the	  nearly	  thirty	  years	  that	  this	  thesis	  explors	  forever	  changed	  Chile.	  The	  twists	  and	  turns	  in	  U.S.	  economic	  policy,	  from	  the	  Alliance	  for	  Progress	  under	  Kennedy	  to	  the	  revocation	  of	  OPIC	  under	  Reagan,	  created	  a	  situation	  in	  which	  the	  Chilean	  economy	  and	  political	  system	  would	  be	  heavily	  influenced	  by	  the	  American	  government.	  	  	   As	  mentioned	  in	  the	  brief	  summary	  of	  U.S.-­‐Chilean	  relations	  that	  I	  just	  offered,	  the	  Alliance	  for	  Progress	  was	  a	  major	  turning	  point	  for	  how	  American	  policymakers	  interacted	  with	  Chile.	  Following	  decades	  of	  large	  levels	  of	  U.S.	  involvement	  in	  the	  highly	  extractive	  copper	  industry,	  President	  Kennedy	  crafted	  the	  Alliance	  for	  Progress	  to	  help	  alleviate	  many	  of	  the	  social	  and	  economic	  ills	  that	  were	  rampant	  in	  Latin	  America.	  For	  Chile,	  the	  Alliance	  for	  Progress	  provided	  funding	  for	  “large-­‐scale	  public	  works	  projects”	  and	  other	  attempts	  to	  fight	  the	  “mounting	  social	  problems	  being	  created	  by	  Chile’s	  slow	  and	  uneven	  economic	  growth.”210	  	   Kennedy’s	  Alliance	  for	  Progress	  was	  a	  major	  economic	  initiative	  that	  poured	  funds	  both	  directly	  from	  the	  American	  government	  as	  well	  as	  through	  multilateral	  development	  banks	  that	  were	  backed	  by	  the	  American	  government.	  Under	  normal	  circumstances,	  the	  program	  could	  have	  been	  successful	  in	  alleviating	  economic	  troubles	  and	  ensuring	  political	  stability.	  However,	  the	  massive	  growth	  of	  the	  Chilean	  population	  in	  the	  early	  1960’s	  created	  a	  situation	  in	  which	  the	  Alliance	  for	  Progress	  funds	  and	  projects	  could	  not	  keep	  up	  with	  the	  migration	  of	  the	  rural	  poor	  to	  cities.	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As	  a	  result,	  many	  of	  the	  socioeconomic	  issues	  were	  left	  as	  they	  were,	  or	  got	  even	  worse	  than	  before211.	  	  	   With	  the	  growth	  of	  the	  general	  public	  came	  the	  growth	  of	  the	  electorate.	  By	  the	  mid	  1960’s,	  the	  popularity	  of	  leftist	  political	  parties	  had	  skyrocketed,	  largely	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  failure	  by	  the	  Alliance	  for	  Progress	  to	  adequately	  address	  key	  social	  problems.	  As	  Alan	  McPherson	  argues	  in	  “Intimate	  Ties,	  Bitter	  Struggles,”	  the	  large	  majority	  of	  Alliance	  for	  Progress	  funds	  did	  not	  go	  to	  the	  poor	  populations	  and	  economic	  growth	  was	  negligible:	  “UN	  investigations	  showed	  that	  in	  the	  1960s,	  out	  of	  every	  $100	  increase	  in	  wealth,	  a	  mere	  $2	  went	  to	  the	  poor…Overall,	  Latin	  American	  economies	  grew	  only	  by	  1.5	  percent	  while	  the	  jobless	  increased	  from	  18	  to	  25	  million.”212	  These	  issues	  led	  to	  massive	  backlash	  against	  the	  Christian	  Democrats,	  and	  in	  1970	  the	  Chilean	  people	  elected	  Salvador	  Allende	  to	  the	  Presidency	  in	  hopes	  that	  he	  would	  save	  them	  from	  the	  socioeconomic	  turmoil	  that	  they	  were	  facing.	  	  	   The	  1970	  election	  sent	  shockwaves	  through	  the	  Nixon	  White	  House.	  Nearly	  immediately,	  President	  Nixon	  and	  his	  close	  advisors	  began	  a	  multi-­‐pronged	  approach	  to	  destabilize	  Allende	  and	  create	  the	  conditions	  for	  a	  coup.	  Economic	  destabilization	  within	  Chile	  was	  quickly	  achieved	  through	  covert	  operations	  by	  the	  CIA	  as	  well	  as	  bold	  actions	  by	  the	  American	  and	  Chilean	  business	  community.	  The	  three	  years	  that	  Allende	  experienced	  in	  power	  were	  marked	  by	  a	  severe	  economic	  downturn	  that	  ended	  with	  a	  violent	  military	  coup	  in	  September	  of	  1973.	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   The	  relationship	  between	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Allende’s	  successor,	  Augusto	  Pinochet,	  was	  heavily	  complex	  and	  far	  from	  static.	  During	  the	  first	  few	  years	  of	  the	  new	  Chilean	  military	  regime,	  the	  American	  government	  and	  business	  community	  made	  significant	  attempts	  to	  help	  stabilize	  Chile	  through	  economic	  means.	  The	  levels	  of	  foreign	  aid	  from	  Washington	  and	  Santiago	  skyrocketed,	  and	  the	  creation	  of	  OPIC	  is	  one	  example	  of	  how	  the	  American	  private	  sector	  was	  able	  to	  help	  shape	  foreign	  economic	  policy.	  	  	   The	  period	  in	  which	  economic	  relations	  between	  the	  U.S.	  and	  Chile	  were	  stable	  came	  to	  a	  halt	  in	  the	  late	  1970’s	  when	  Pinochet’s	  egregious	  human	  rights	  violations	  began	  gaining	  international	  attention.	  Under	  President	  Jimmy	  Carter,	  the	  United	  States	  government	  began	  to	  reevaluate	  its	  economic	  relationship	  with	  the	  Chilean	  dictator.	  Foreign	  aid	  was	  slashed,	  and	  diplomatic	  engagements	  turned	  less-­‐than-­‐friendly.	  	  Despite	  President	  Reagan’s	  attempts	  early	  on	  in	  his	  time	  in	  office	  to	  normalize	  relations	  with	  Pinochet,	  by	  the	  mid-­‐1980’s	  it	  became	  clear	  that	  the	  United	  States	  government	  wanted	  to	  see	  Pinochet	  out	  of	  power.	  	  	   The	  final	  stage	  of	  this	  troubled	  chronology	  occurred	  in	  1988	  when	  Pinochet	  announced	  a	  plebiscite	  in	  which	  the	  Chilean	  people	  would	  have	  the	  ability	  to	  vote	  him	  out	  of	  power.	  Under	  mounting	  pressure	  from	  both	  the	  United	  States	  and	  the	  international	  community,	  Pinochet	  called	  for	  this	  plebiscite,	  which	  he	  eventually	  lost.	  Following	  this	  defeat,	  the	  Chilean	  political	  system	  slowly	  returned	  to	  a	  state	  of	  normalcy	  under	  the	  government	  of	  the	  Christian	  Democrat,	  Patricio	  Aylwin213.	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Between	  1990	  and	  1998,	  the	  Chilean	  economy	  experienced	  rapid	  growth	  that	  was	  accompanied	  by	  huge	  increases	  in	  political	  involvement	  and	  stability214.	  	  	   My	  most	  significant	  contribution	  to	  this	  area	  of	  scholarship	  is	  the	  examination	  of	  Reagan’s	  turnaround	  when	  it	  came	  to	  dealing	  with	  Chile	  and	  Pinochet.	  In	  the	  third	  chapter	  of	  this	  thesis,	  I	  used	  primary	  and	  secondary	  sources	  to	  explain	  the	  political	  and	  economic	  climate	  in	  which	  President	  Reagan	  had	  to	  craft	  a	  grand	  Chilean	  strategy.	  	  From	  1980	  to	  1982,	  the	  Reagan	  Administration	  was	  self-­‐admittedly	  aggressively	  anti-­‐Communist	  and,	  as	  a	  result,	  lifted	  sanctions	  and	  crafted	  new	  economic	  policies	  that	  were	  beneficial	  to	  the	  authoritarian	  and	  anti-­‐Communist	  Pinochet	  regime.	  However,	  by	  1982	  a	  number	  of	  different	  factors	  changed	  Reagan’s	  outlook	  on	  U.S.	  economic	  policy	  toward	  Chile.	  	  	   Among	  these	  factors,	  a	  global	  economic	  downturn	  and	  a	  newly	  discovered	  passion	  within	  the	  Reagan	  Administration	  for	  proliferating	  democratic	  tradition	  are	  two	  of	  the	  most	  clear.	  However,	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  primary	  catalyst	  for	  a	  change	  in	  U.S.	  economic	  policy	  was	  a	  recognition	  that	  the	  aggressive	  nature	  of	  the	  Pinochet	  regime	  was	  breeding	  a	  radical	  and	  leftist	  opposition	  within	  Chile.	  Furthermore,	  Reagan	  and	  his	  advisors	  were	  concerned	  that	  the	  massive	  human	  rights	  violations	  and	  rising	  popularity	  of	  this	  domestic	  opposition	  would	  substantially	  weaken	  the	  Chilean	  state,	  and	  eventually	  cause	  the	  government	  to	  collapse.	  	  	  	   After	  recognizing	  these	  concerns,	  the	  Reagan	  Administration	  began	  the	  process	  of	  slowly	  distancing	  itself	  from	  the	  Pinochet	  regime.	  Although	  Reagan’s	  rhetoric	  was	  much	  stronger	  in	  many	  cases	  than	  his	  actual	  actions,	  his	  decision	  to	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explore	  alternatives	  to	  the	  Pinochet	  regime	  and	  also	  create	  contingency	  plans	  in	  the	  case	  of	  a	  collapsed	  Chilean	  government	  is	  reflective	  of	  his	  loss	  of	  faith	  within	  Pinochet.	  	  By	  1985	  Reagan	  had	  fully	  committed	  to	  promoting	  a	  democratic	  transition	  for	  the	  Chilean	  government,	  and	  it	  was	  only	  a	  matter	  of	  years	  until	  Pinochet	  lost	  power	  through	  a	  special	  election	  that	  the	  dictator	  had	  scheduled	  himself.	  	  	   Between	  1960	  and	  1988,	  U.S.	  economic	  policy	  directed	  toward	  Chile	  was	  highly	  transformative.	  As	  previously	  mentioned,	  the	  various	  American	  Presidents	  used	  economic	  policies	  to	  help	  achieve	  the	  goals	  that	  they	  saw	  as	  essential.	  At	  times,	  these	  policies	  attempted	  to	  address	  economic	  issues	  in	  order	  to	  ensure	  political	  stability	  in	  Chile.	  In	  other	  cases,	  economic	  policy	  was	  highly	  aggressive	  and	  attempted	  to	  directly	  fight	  off	  communist	  influence.	  	  	   Furthermore,	  neoliberal	  economic	  policies	  played	  a	  substantial	  role	  in	  the	  development	  of	  U.S.	  economic	  policy	  toward	  Chile	  during	  this	  time.	  American	  policymakers	  as	  well	  as	  Augusto	  Pinochet	  embraced	  the	  neoliberal	  economic	  model.	  Neoliberalism	  focuses	  on	  free	  market	  policies	  and	  the	  promotion	  of	  the	  private	  sector	  and	  foreign	  direct	  investment	  as	  fundamental	  aspects	  of	  a	  growing	  economy.	  The	  promotion	  of	  these	  practices	  by	  the	  American	  government	  and	  Chilean	  government	  helped	  create	  an	  economic	  model	  heavily	  supported	  by	  Milton	  Friedman	  and	  other	  scholars	  from	  the	  University	  of	  Chicago,	  or	  “Chicago	  Boys.”	  	  	   To	  the	  dismay	  of	  Pinochet	  and	  his	  American	  supporters,	  the	  radical	  free	  market	  policies	  enacted	  in	  Chile	  eventually	  caused	  an	  economic	  downturn	  as	  the	  fledgling	  Chilean	  economy	  was	  faced	  with	  fierce	  international	  competition.	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Unemployment	  rose,	  productivity	  fell,	  and	  GDP	  contracted	  heavily.	  Pinochet’s	  neoliberal	  experiment	  had	  largely	  failed,	  and	  the	  Chilean	  economy	  did	  not	  fully	  recover	  until	  the	  late	  1980’s.	  	  	   The	  ebbs	  and	  flows	  of	  American	  economic	  policy	  toward	  Chile	  provide	  an	  interesting	  look	  at	  the	  way	  that	  the	  United	  States	  government	  achieved,	  or	  attempted	  to	  achieve,	  its	  political	  and	  economical	  objectives	  during	  the	  Cold	  War.	  In	  dealing	  with	  Chile	  specifically,	  American	  policymakers	  had	  to	  take	  a	  variety	  of	  factors	  into	  consideration	  when	  crafting	  foreign	  policy.	  In	  many	  cases,	  these	  policymakers	  used	  economic	  leverage	  or	  pressure	  to	  ensure	  political	  and	  economic	  stability	  to	  ward	  off	  the	  threat	  of	  communism.	  In	  other	  cases,	  economic	  policy	  was	  used	  purely	  as	  a	  weapon	  against	  communism	  or	  leftist	  expansion.	  	  In	  this	  examination	  of	  American	  economic	  policy	  toward	  Chile,	  there	  was	  no	  shortage	  of	  either	  types	  of	  economic	  policy.	  From	  President	  Kennedy	  to	  President	  Reagan,	  Cold	  War	  objectives	  in	  the	  Southern	  Cone	  were	  secured	  through	  overt	  and	  covert	  economic	  warfare.	  Without	  U.S.	  economic	  involvement	  in	  Chile,	  there	  would	  have	  been	  a	  much	  different	  story	  for	  the	  historians	  to	  write.	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